Terrorist or Revolutionary: The Development of the PoliticalOffender Exception and Its Effects onDefining Terrorism in International Law by DeFabo, Vincent
American University National Security Law Brief
Volume 2 | Issue 2 Article 5
2012
Terrorist or Revolutionary: The Development of
the PoliticalOffender Exception and Its Effects
onDefining Terrorism in International Law
Vincent DeFabo
American University Washington College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/nslb
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University National Security Law Brief by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
DeFabo, Vincent "Terrorist or Revolutionary: The Development of the PoliticalOffender Exception and Its Effects onDefining
Terrorism in International Law," American University National Security Law Brief, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2012).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/nslb/vol2/iss2/5
69NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEFVol. 2, No. 2
TERRORIST OR REVOLUTIONARY: 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLITICAL 
OFFENDER EXCEPTION AND ITS EFFECTS ON 
DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Vincent DeFaBo
i. introDuCtion 
Coming to a consensus on the definition of  terrorism has escaped not only multi-national orga-
nizations, like the United Nations,1  but even individual nations, such as the United States.2  This has 
led one scholar to exclaim that “[n]o paper on the crime of  terrorism would be complete without the 
introductory observation that its definition is not generally agreed upon.”3  The lack of  consensus in 
a definition of  terrorism could be said to be unproblematic because terrorist acts can be punished as 
ordinary criminal offences within individual nations.4  Also, the international community has worked 
without a coherent definition of  terrorism for decades.5  However, it is important to have a defini-
tion of  terrorism from a legal standpoint;6 without a definition of  terrorism the international com-
munity is unable to definitively condemn certain actions and work coherently to eradicate terrorism.7 
Moreover, without a definition, counter-terrorism measures and oppressive regimes sometimes go 
1  The United Nations has not passed anything beyond condemnation measures.  See generally G.A. Res. 3034 (XXVII), 
U.N. Doc. A/8967(Dec. 18, 1972)(on measures to prevent international terrorism); G.A. Res. 40/61, U.N. GAOR, 40th 
Sess., (Dec. 09, 1985) (stating that the United Nations has not passed anything beyond condemnation measures.); see also 
18 U.S.C. §2331(1) 2006 (showing that there is a definition of  “terrorism” in the U.S. Code, but this is arguably only used 
for purposes of  designating certain groups as terrorism for purposes of  limit financing and immigration issues only). 
2  There is a definition of  “terrorism” in the U.S. Code, but this is arguably only used for purposes of  designating 
certain groups as terrorists for purposes of  limit financing and immigration issues only.  18 U.S.C. §2331(1) 2006.   The 
Department of  Defense and the Federal Bureau of  Investigation have their own definitions. Nicholas J. Perry, The 
Numerous Federal Definitions of  Terrorism: The Problem of  Too Many Grails, 30 J. legis. 249, 250 (2004) (explaining that there 
are nineteen distinct definitions of  terrorism in the U.S. Code). 
3  Erin Creegan, A Permanent Hybrid Court for Terrorism, 26 aM. u. int’l l. rev. 237, 240 (2011). 
4  See id. at 240-243 (showing the various different definitions for terrorism and the problems that arise because of  
this).
5  See John F. Murphy, Defining International Terrorism:  A Way out of  the Quagmire, in 19 isr. y.b. h.r., 23-25 (Yoram 
Dinstein and Mala Tabory eds., 1990) (showing that there is no common definition for terrorism).
6  See generally ben saul, DeFining terrorisM in international law 10-15 (2006). 
7  See generally id. at 10-11. 
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too far, potentially encompassing even nonviolent political protests.8  Finally, the lack of  coherence 
on a definition strains international relations and muddies the waters of  asylum law.9   
To properly define terrorism, it is necessary to go back to the original reason for reaching an 
international definition of  terrorism: the political offender exception.10  Problems arose during the 
nineteenth century with how to treat political offenders that sought refuge in foreign nations.11  The 
idea that the “enemy of  my enemy is my friend” often left states in the curious position of  holding 
an individual who committed a political crime in an enemy state and giving him or her immunity 
from extradition.12  To avoid the possibility of  conflict, states created the political offender exception 
to extradition.13  Also, many nations had been newly formed on ideals of  democratic rebellion and 
did not want to extradite their brethren in revolutionary movements.14  Under the political offender 
exception, if  an individual committed a political offence he or she would not be extradited, even if  
there was a common criminal element to the political offender’s actions.15  
The political offender exception created a new problem of  those who committed certain polit-
ically-motivated acts (usually violent), offended international standards of  justified political action, 
and harmed persons who deserved protecting, such as heads of  state.16  To discourage extreme 
political offences, an exception was created within the exception: those who committed “terrorist ac-
tions” would not be safe from extradition.17  Thus, one cannot begin to define terrorism or know of  
the complications in seeking a universal definition without understanding how the exception to the 
political offender came into existence.18 
It is through studying the history of  the political offence exception, and seeing its effects on 
8  See id. (stating that a common theme in both common law and civil law is that generally one cannot be convicted for 
ex post facto laws, but without a definition of  terrorism this is exactly what nations are doing).
9  See infra Section IV. 
10  See infra Section III. 
11  See Gregory Chadwick Perry, Comment, The Four Major Western Approaches to the Political Offence Exception to 
Extradition:  From Inception to Modern Terrorism, 40 MerCer l. rev. 709, 713 (1989) (stating that it is up to each state to 
determine who they shall let in to their country).
12  See Gray Culbreath, Joint Defense Agreements, 19 s.C. law 36, 39 (2008) (stating that the “enemy of  my enemy is my 
friend” is an old Arab proverb); see also Perry, supra note 11, at 716 (showing that sovereigns did not want to extradite 
political offenders). 
13  See, e.g., Perry, supra note 11, at 713 (“The repression of  crime and the punishment of  offenders has become of  
vital interest to states.”). 
14  See Bradley Larschan, Comment, Extradition, The Political Offence Exception and Terrorism: an Overview of  the Three 
Principal Theories of  Law, 4 b.u. int’l l.J. 231, 243-46 (1989) (saying that this change in attitude is reflected in the 
exclusion of  political criminals from extradition to the state in which the offence was committed). 
15  See Perry, supra note 11, at 715-16 (showing that political offence is the exception to the general rule of  honoring 
an extradition request, even by a friendly nation). 
16  See also R. Stuart Phillips, Comment, The Political Offence Exception and Terrorism:  Its Place in the Current Extradition 
Scheme and Proposals for its Future, 15 DiCk. J. int’l l. 337, 341 (1997) (stating that the problem was solved by adopting a 
restrictive definition of  political). 
17  See id. (showing that attempts on the life of  the head of  state was not sufficiently political so as to refuse 
extradition).   
18  See id. (explaining that the “political offence exception developed out of  identification of  liberal democrats with 
political offenders”).   
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modern national and international law, that the definition of  terrorism will be more clearly defined.  
In other words, by answering the question of  why terrorism was originally found to be an interna-
tional crime, it is easier to determine the definition of  terrorism.  Besides defining terrorism through 
studying the political offender exception, this paper seeks to address the following issues: how the 
old political offender exception applies to today’s international legal system; what complications have 
arisen in the political offender exception; why the international community should define terrorism, 
and; what treaties and concepts should be used to define terrorism.  While defining terrorism may be 
a challenge, the task can be simplified by examining the political offender exception and its effects 
on modern international law.19
ii. history oF the PolitiCal oFFenDer exCePtion
The practice of  extradition has existed for centuries, beginning in Egyptian, Chinese, Chaldean, 
and Assyro-Babylonian civilizations.20  Nations sought extradition for treason, attempts to assassi-
nate the monarch, and anything else that could affect the political influence and policies of  the mon-
arch.21  Hugo Grotius warned about the possibility of  war without proper extradition procedures, 
writing, “among the evils that arise from differences between states” is “the fact that [i]t is possible 
for those who have done wrong to one state to flee to another for refuge.”22  In the early eighteenth 
century, common criminals escaping to other nations was not seen as an international problem, part 
of  the general public danger that warranted international treaties, or even a major concern.23  Thus, 
extradition was originally developed to return those who threatened the monarch and disrupted the 
political order.24
Extradition treatises for common crimes did not begin until the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.25  Current extradition law allows for the possibility of  international administrative of  jus-
tice and has a more domestic character.26  International extradition, as it stands currently in interna-
tional law, can be defined as the “process by which one nation surrenders for purposes of  trial and 
19  See id. at 348-352 (showing the problems that arise when states fail to define terrorism and political offence). 
20  See Perry, supra note 11, at 713 (citing M. CheriF bassiouni, international extraDition anD worlD PubliC 
orDer 371 (1974)). 
21  Id. at 714. 
22  Matthew e. PriCe, rethinking asyluM: history, PurPose, anD liMits 35 (2009) (citing hugo grotius, rights 
oF war anD PeaCe (A.C. Campbell, trans. II. 21.5.1 ed. 1979).
23  Christine van Den wiJngaert, the PolitiCal oFFenCe exCePtion to extraDition: the DeliCate ProbleM oF 
balanCing the rights oF the inDiviDual anD the international PubliC orDer 5 (1980) (explaining that sovereigns 
were totally indifferent towards persons who had fled the country and normally took no measures to continue 
prosecution extraterritorially). 
24  Id.   
25  See Perry, supra note 11, at 715.
26  See wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 38 (showing that the judicial control on decisions with respect to extradition has a 
domestic characteristic).  
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punishment, individuals accused of  crimes committed outside its borders, to the nation in which the 
alleged crimes are committed.”27  
The political offence exception to extradition is a relatively recent development in international 
law.28  Before the French Revolution, the term “political offence” was not even a component of  the 
Law of  Nations.29  However, with the rise of  constitutionalism and democratic governments, politi-
cal thought was transformed, and with it arose the concept of  political offence.30  Article 120 of  The 
Jacobean Constitution of  1793 declared that the French, “grants asylum to foreigners banished from 
their countries for the cause of  freedom . . . it will be denied to tyrants!”31  However, it was not until 
the nineteenth century that the political offence exception was generally recognized and what was 
once the purpose of  extradition became the exception to it.32
As Enlightenment and democratic movements swept across European states in the nineteenth 
century, political offenders who committed crimes in their homeland were viewed more sympa-
thetically.33  Additionally, nations wanted to at least nominally support individuals who supported 
rebellion in enemy nations without going to war themselves.34  After all, the “enemy of  my enemy is 
my friend.”35  Political offenders were viewed as the heroic fighters against tyranny, and the political 
offender exception to extradition was seen as the way to support these heroes.36  It became common 
practice that extradition would not apply to those who were unsuccessful in overthrowing oppressive 
governments.37  Political offenders were treated well, even if  they were imprisoned.38  For example, 
27  See Barbara Ann Banoff  & Christopher H. Pyle, To Surrender Political Offenders’: The Political Offense Exception to 
Extradition in the United States Law, 16 n.y.u. J. int’l. & Pol. 169, 173 (1984) (citing Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 
(1902)) (defining extradition as the “surrender by one nation of  an individual accused or convicted of  an offence outside 
of  its own terrorist, and within the territorial jurisdiction of  the other, which being competent to try and punish him, 
demands surrender”). 
28  See satya Deva beDi, extraDition in international law anD PraCtiCe 180 (1966) (highlighting that the 
development is recent). 
29  Id.   
30  See id. at 180-181 (stating that the right of  the individual to revolt against despotism and absolutism accompanied 
the rise of  constitutionalism and democratic governments).
31  wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 9. 
32  See generally beDi, supra note 28, at 178-181. 
33  See Larschan, supra note 14, at 243-244 (showing that John Stuart Mill argued that if  individuals had right to rebel 
against oppressive government, then those who failed should be permitted refuge in a foreign nation); see id. at 244-45 
(citing beDi, supra note 28, at 180-81 (1966). 
34  See Wijngaert, supra note 23, at 14 (political offenders exception was drafted with romanticism of  liberal 
revolutionaries). 
35  See Culbreath, supra note 12, at 36 (explaining the source of  “enemy of  my enemy is my friend”).
36  See Banoff, supra note 27, at 180-81 (political offenders were seen as heroically fighting against tyrannical 
government at best and committing government at worst); see also beDi, supra note 28, at 180 (political offenders were 
seen as heroes). 
37  See Perry, supra note 11, at 715-716 (showing that states began the practice of  granting asylum to those whose coup 
attempts failed). 
38  See Larschan, supra note 14, at 242.
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Adolf  Hitler was labeled as a political offender and while imprisoned was able to write Mein Kampf.39  
Political offenders were thus given a certain amount of  respect for their struggles, even if  their po-
litical motivations were antagonist to the political party in power.40
The movement to give refuge to political offenders through the political offence exception was 
written into law in many nations, beginning in Europe.41  Belgium was the first nation to codify the 
political offence exception by statute in the Belgian Extradition Act of  October 1, 1833.42  Before 
this time, extradition was handled purely at the executive level, so the first codification of  extradition 
involved the political offender exception.43  Other nations followed suit.  For example, the British 
Extradition Act of  1870 required in Article 3(1) that a “fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if  
the offence in respect of  which his surrender is demanded is one of  political character, or . . . the 
requisition for his surrender has in fact been made with a view to try or punish him for an offence 
of  a political character.”44  The statutory codification of  the political offender exception became 
common throughout nations, starting primarily in European and Western countries.45  
Besides individual statutes and constitutional declarations, the political offender exception be-
came part of  bilateral agreements in the early nineteenth century.46  France and Belgium executed 
the first extradition treaty that contained a political offender exception on November 2, 1833.47  
France then went on to conduct similar treaties with the United States in 1843 and England in 
1852.48  Treaties became the primary method of  spreading the political offender exception in Anglo-
Saxon countries, with Belgium at the lead of  the movement.49 
Even autocracies created a political offence exception in their laws and treaties because “without 
it, the liberal states were unwilling to extradite ordinary criminals to them.”50  Perhaps part of  the 
appeal of  the political offence exception was that political ideology was technically not applicable.51  
On its face, it did not matter whether a political offender was for democracy, autocracy, or liberalism, 
because if  someone committed a political offence they could not be extradited.52  Political crimes are 
39  e.g., e. DaviDson, the Making oF aDolPh hitler 240 (1977) (mentioning that Hitler’s confinement was deluxe 
and he had the leisure of  dictating Mein Kampf  to Rudolf  Hess). 
40  See Larschan, supra note 14, at 242-243. 
41  See id. (explaining how French and British law affected the treatment of  political offenders). 
42  wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 12.  
43  Id.   
44  Larschan, supra note 14, at 246 (citing The Extradition Act, 33 & 34 Vict., C. 52. (1870) (UK)).
45  See wiJgaert, supra note 23, at 12-14 (showing the various laws enacted by European and Western countries). 
46  Id. at 13-14. 
47  Id. at 13. 
48  Id. Belgium has been called a leading nation (‘Leitnation’) with respect to extradition law.  By 1890, the country 
has exclude twenty-five extradition treaties.  See id. at 13 n.66 (stating that Belgium has been called a leading nation 
(‘Leitnation’) with respect to extradition law.  By 1890, the country has executed twenty-five extradition treaties).
49  Id. 
50  PriCe, supra note 22, at 48. 
51  See id. at 49 (stating that the political offence exception gave asylum to any political offender, regardless of  
offender’s ideological goals).
52  See id. (“[o]n its face, the political offence  exception appears impartial—it gives asylum to political offenders, 
regardless of  whether they are for autocracy or democracy, deposition, or liberalism”).  
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deemed intrinsically not criminal because the individual’s motives are to benefit society and not him 
or herself  personally.53  However, the political offence exception was primarily a creation by liberal 
nations to support those in the fight against tyranny, and in practice, its application only applied to 
these like-minded revolutionaries.54 
The political offender exception spread to other Western countries and throughout much of  
the world.55  Throughout this development four main principles developed for the political offender 
exception: (1) the recognition of  the legitimacy of  political dissent; (2) the desire to protect politi-
cal offenders from summary execution or a biased judicial proceeding; (3) the belief  that extraditing 
states should not weigh in on the internal affairs of  the requesting state; and (4) the practical reason-
ing that it is better not to bear the wrath of  insurgent groups that could spread to one’s own govern-
ment.56
Almost from its inception, the political offender exception was limited by confining the defini-
tion of  political crime.57  The uncomfortable situation of  giving refuge to individuals who assassi-
nated heads of  state or attempted to do so was too difficult for many nations to accept.58  Belgium, 
the nation that first put into law the political offender exception, was also the first nation to enact 
legislation that restricted what was considered a political crime after having to refuse extradition of  
two would be assassins of  French Emperor Napoleon III.59  This exception to the political offence 
exception was initially named the Belgium clause, but is more commonly referred to as the attentat 
53  See Nadia Yakoob, Political Offender or Serious Criminal? Challenge the Interpretation of  “Serious, Nonpolitical Crimes” in 
INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 14 geo. iMMigr. l.J. 545, 549 (2000) (explaining that political offender’s actions are not criminal 
because the perpetrator, in theory, is motivated by benefiting society making his or her actions less reprehensible and 
possibly excusable). 
54  See beDi, supra note 28, at 180-81 (noting that the “rise of  constitutionalism and democratic governments” 
contributed to a notion of  the right to revolt); see also Perry, supra note 11, at 716 (“traditional states sought to continue 
to punish political offenders, while the newer state promoted self-determination of  peoples and democratic though and 
process, even if  rebellion ensued.”). 
55  See wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 18-21 (stating that extradition has been linked to the concept of  international 
criminal justice).
56  See Michael R. Littenberg, The Political Offence Exception: An Historical Analysis and Model for the Future, 64 tul. l. rev. 
1195, 1198 (1990) (citing Harvard Research in International Law, Extradition, 29 aM. J. int’l l. suPP. 1, 362-63 (1935); 
M. bassiouni, international extraDition anD worlD PubliC orDer 4-5 (1974).  The fourth practical reason for 
allowing for extradition was obviously not explicitly stated, but has been accepted by scholars as a motivating factor in 
the creation of  the political offence exception.  Id.; see also wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 22 (discussing the early practical 
difficulties of  international extradition law). 
57  See wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 14 (noting that in 1831 Belgian legislators wanted to enact a definition of  ‘political 
crime’ but were struggling to do so because the many revolutions occurring at the time).
58  See Perry, supra note 11, at 717-18 (stating that many states have recognized the limitation of  the political offence 
exception for assassination attempts on heads of  states) (citing l. oPPenheiM, international law 709 (H. Lautherpacht 
ed. 7th ed., 1948). 
59  See wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 14-15.  Napoleon was making a short trip by train to Tournai, Belgium. Id.  Two 
Frenchmen living in Belgium placed a bomb on the railway that exploded, but did not kill Napoleon.  Id. Subsequently, 
the Court of  Appeals of  Brussels rendered a negative advisory opinion for the two Frenchmen’s extradition holding that 
the political offence exception applied.  Id. at 14-15 n.73-74. 
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clause.60  “The importance of  this clause lies not only in the fact that it has been widely accepted, but 
also in its technical approach to the formalization of  exception to the political offence exception: the 
depoliticizing formula.”61  
International law and nations developed an “exception to the exception” in the form of  the 
attentant clause.62  Like Belgium, nations did not want to be in the position of  protecting individuals 
who assassinated or attempted to assassinate heads of  state.63  The nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries saw the expansion of  the attentat clause to include acts of  genocide, wars crimes, apartheid, and 
acts of  terrorism.64  The development of  the exception to the political offender exception, as well as 
its application to acts of  terrorism, will together be the focus of  the rest of  this article. 
iii. DeveloPMent oF the PolitiCal oFFenDer exCePtion
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the exception to the political offender exception was 
developed by refining what was labeled as political.65  Offences were divided into pure political and 
relative political offences.66  Additionally, nations’ judiciaries developed individual tests for defining 
the elements of  what is a political offence.67  Finally, the exception to the political offender excep-
tion has led to the development of  new condemnable actions not considered political in nature by 
international legal discourse and treaties, which is now commonly referred to as terrorism.68  The 
stakes are obviously high because a state that chooses not to label an individual as political offender 
may extradite the individual to a nation where he or she is bound to face prosecution.69
There has never been a precise definition of  what constitutes a political offence between states, 
which has generally led to different interpretations of  the term.70  Political offences can easily been 
limited to acts of  treason and sedation, but this limits political offences to situations where there is a 
60  See id.   
61  Id. at 16 (emphasis added); see also Perry, supra note 11, at 71 (“The first attempt to clarify this complex issue of  
‘relative political offence’ was the attentat clause”) (emphasis added).
62  See Phillips, supra note 16, at 341 (“This new definition carved out several ‘exceptions to the exception,’ with the 
most notable being the attentat clause which stated that attempts on the life of  the head of  state was not sufficiently 
political so as to refuse extradition”). 
63  Id.   
64  wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 16. 
65  See beDi, supra note 28, at 180-81. 
66  See id. (discussing the branching definition of  political offences, in which pure political offences were those directed 
against governments, while relative political offences were those of  “common character” but connected to political acts); 
see also, Phillips, supra note 16, at 341 (stating that during the struggle to determine which offences merit protection, there 
was a division labeling some political offences as pure and others as relative). 
67  See Perry, supra note 11, at 718 (“[V]arious interpretations have emerged in determining what elements constitute a 
‘political offence.’”).   
68  See beDi, supra note 28, at 180, 186-92 (arguing that there are certain types of  actions that are “[i]nimical to the very 
concept of  civilization”).
69  See Perry, supra note 11, at 718 (citing Thompson, The Evolution of  the Political Offence Exception in an Age of  Political 
Violence, 9 yale J. worlD Pub. orD. 315, 317 (1982-1983)(“[O]nce an authority labels an offence as ‘political’, a state 
may legitimately deny extradition”). 
70  See beDi, supra note 28, at 181 (noting the lack of  agreement between states). 
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common criminal element that is still of  a political nature.71  Thomas Jefferson, in expressing reser-
vations about extraditing Spanish fugitives wanted for treason, stated that  “[t]he unsuccessful strug-
glers against tyranny have been the chief  martyrs of  treason laws in all countries . . . [w]e should not 
wish, then, to give up to the executioner the patriot who fails and flees to us.”72  Thus, the initial nar-
rowing of  political in political offences was simply an implicit requirement that the political offender 
be committed to the ideals of  democracy, although this did not appear in any formal text.73  Adher-
ing to an implicit and unwritten test was insufficient for limiting what could be considered political, 
and courts began placing political offences into either pure or relative categories.74 
Pure political offences are generally “offences directed against the political organization or gov-
ernment of  a state, containing no element of  a common crime whatsoever.”75  The “no common 
crime element” denotes passive dissidence that does not constitute a direct attack against a state or 
institution.76  Also, besides not being accomplished by the commission of  a common crime, pure 
political offences cause no injury to private persons, property, or interests.77  A political offender 
who commits a pure political offence is merely acting as an agent for a group that wants to alter the 
political structure of  the state.78  A French court in the Giovanni Gatti Case reasoned that pure politi-
cal offences are “[t]hose which [cause] injury the political organism, which are directed against the 
constitution of  the Government and against sovereignty, [and] which trouble the order established 
by the fundamental laws of  the state and distribution of  power.”79  In most cases, there is no duty to 
extradite individuals who commit a pure political offence because these actions are deemed to be far 
removed from the common crime and closely related to the ideals of  the political offender excep-
tion.80  Moreover, there is not the issue of  conflicts among treaties in pure political offences.81  There 
is general agreement among states that the political offender who commits a pure political offence 
71  See PriCe, supra note 22, at 50 (“For example, one could murder a political official or rob to obtain funds for a 
political group.”).  
72  Id. at 51 (citing American State Papers, Documents, Legislative and Executive, of  the Congress of  the United States, vol. 1, 
1789-1815 (Washington, DC: Gales and Seaton, 1832), p. 258). 
73  See wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 18 (“[T]he political offence  exception has a clear political function, but also a 
political limitation, the rule being meant as protection for those who committed themselves to the cause of  democracy.  
This limitation, however, was not explicit in the texts.”).  
74  See beDi, supra note 28, at 181 (discussing the distinction between pure and relative political offences); wiJngaert, 
supra note 23, at 106-10 (“[I]n extradition theory and practice the necessity has been felt to introduce certain 
terminological nuances . . . .”); Larschan, supra note 14, at 247-49 (“The phrase “political offense” has traditionally had 
two different, although closely related, meanings . . . .”).
75  beDi, supra note 28, at 181. 
76  wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 107. 
77  Id. at 106-07. 
78  Larschan, supra note 14, at 248-49.
79  In re Givoanni Gatti, 14 ann. Dig. 145 (Cour d’appel, Grenoble 1947). 
80  See wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 107 (“[T]here is usually no duty to extradite with regard to purely political offences, 
so that the political offence exception in these cases is, as a matter of  fact, superfluous.”); see also Banhoff, supra note 27, 
at 178-79.  
81  See Banhoff, supra note 27, at 178 (“[‘Pure’] political crimes have not created many difficulties in interpretation 
because such acts are not treaty offences.”).  
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carries no malice or injury to any individual and only affects the organizational structure of  a state.82  
The political offender exception always applies to individual who commit pure political offences.83 
The closer question for extradition occurs in conduct deemed to be relative political offences 
because these incidents more closely intertwine political and common crimes elements.84  A relative 
political offence “involves the commission of  a common crime in connection with a political act 
or event.”85  Some suggest that merely infusing a political aim or motive to a common crime makes 
it a relative political offence.86  For example, the assassination of  a public official in the course of  
a political disturbance would clearly rise to the level of  relative political offence.87  Relative political 
offences can even appear to be common crimes from the perspective of  an outsider if  it is not clear 
that there is a clear political agenda motivating the criminal action.88
Relative political offences are problematic because of  the hybrid nature between a common 
crime and political nature; states do not want to give de facto immunity simply because there is a 
political element to a crime.89  Naturally the question arises: to what extent does the political motive 
in common crimes rise to the level of  relative political offence that allows for the political offender 
exception to apply?90  The difference in relative and pure political offences is generally not clearly 
defined in internal laws or in international treaties.91  Part of  the statutory ambiguity is intended to 
give states the ability to adjust to changes in the world, but this has also led to a difference in judicial 
interpretation among states.92  The decision of  whether to apply the political offender exception 
hinges on the application of  the relative political offence tests within individual nations.93
To deal with the problem of  defining the relative political offence, the Swiss courts have cre-
82  See beDi, supra note 28, at 181 (asserting that the perpetrator of  political offence affects “[o]nly the political 
organization of  the state”).
83  See wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 107 (“Theoretically, pure political crimes are easily dealt with in extradition law.”).
84  See wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 108-10 (cautioning that the category of  political crimes is broad and can apply to 
all common crime that is “politically motivated or . . .  related to apolitical conflict situation); see also beDi, supra note 28, 
at 181-82 (stating that relative political offences are neither wholly political nor wholly criminal). 
85  Banhoff, supra note 27, at 178.  
86  beDi, supra note 28, at 182. 
87  Id.   
88  See Phillips, supra note 16, at 342-43 (positing that a relative political offence could involve the combination of  a 
common crime with a political one, or a common crime with a political agenda).
89  Id. 
90  wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 108. 
91  See Littenberg, supra note 56, at 1199-1200 (“[s]tatutory ambiguity is intended to give the state flexibility to adapt 
the exception to a changing world.”). 
92  See id. (“[J]udicial bodies have by necessity adopted a variety of  tests to determine when a relative political offence  
satisfies the political offence  exception.”); see also beDi, supra note 28, at 182 (“[I]it is extremely difficult for the courts 
to ascertain the degree of  connection between the common crime and the political act, there is a noteworthy cleavage 
concerning this point among the courts of  different states.”); Phillips, supra note 16, at 342-43 (explaining that relative 
political offence s are problematic because of  the dual element of  crime and political, so that three main tests have 
arisen to deal with this problem). 
93  See wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 108-10 (noting a rough common law—civil law divide in terms of  whether nations 
focus on objective or subjective criteria). 
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ated the predominance or proportionality test.94  The Swiss courts surrender, “only those fugitives 
whose acts were out of  proportion to the political end sought or whose acts were not closely related 
with purely political ends.”95  To meet the political predominance test, the political offence must 
be directly related to attaining the political group’s goal, and the political component to the action 
must predominate over the criminal element or be proportionate to meeting the political objective.96  
These principles were first announced in the case of  V.P. Wassilief.97  In Wassilief, the murder of  
Chief  of  Police of  Penza was predominantly criminal in character because “it did not prepare the 
way for popular representation the guarantee of  individual liberty.”98  
The Swiss further developed their concept of  a relative political offence in the political motiva-
tion predominance test, which appeared first in In re Ockert.99  In that case, the Prussian Ministry 
of  Justice requested extradition of  an individual who had shot a Nazi Party member.100  Since the 
violence in Germany paralleled that of  a civil war the offence was deemed to be proportionate and 
politically sufficient in nature, so that the extradition request was denied.101  Under the Swiss test, 
violence that appears aimless in nature and is directed predominately at civilians is not sufficiently 
political and the individual will be extradited.102  The more violent the alleged action, the greater the 
need for a “direct relationship between the crime and the political goal . . . .”103  German and Belgian 
courts have generally followed a similar approach.104  The Swiss political motivation predominance 
test looks to the motivation of  the political offender and seeks to balance the objective with the 
proportionality of  violence.105 
The French objective test for determining if  conduct is a political offence warranting the politi-
cal offender exception differs from the Swiss test.106  The French objective test declares “an offence 
94  See Perry, supra note 11, at 718-22 (separating the various interpretations of  the political offender exception into 
three general categories, Swiss, French, and Anglo-American).
95  beDi, supra note 28, at 183. 
96  Perry, supra note 11, at 718-22; see also beDi, supra note 28, at 183 (setting out a three element test similar to V.P. 
Wassilief). 
97  beDi, supra note 28, at 182-83 (citing The V.P. Wassilief  Case, reported in Foreign rel. oF the u.s. 520-21). (1909)). 
98  Id.   
99  Duane K. Thomposon, The Evolution of  the Political Offense Exception in an Age of  Political Violence, 9 yale J. worlD 
Pub. orD. 315, 321 (1982-1983) (citing In re Ockert, 7 ann. Dig. 369 (Switz. Fed. Trib. 1933)).
100  Id.   
101  Id.   
102  See Perry, supra note 11, at 720-21 (citing In re Kaphengst, 5 Ann. Dig. 292 (Switz.. Fed. Trib. 1930)) (individual 
accused of  planting several bombs that injured civilians was a violence not proportionate to the desired goal). 
103  Perry, supra note 11, at 721. 
104  See beDi, supra note 28, at 183-84 (citing In re Fabijan, 1933-34 Ann. Dig. 360 (1933)(Ge.); In re Barratini, 1938 
Ann. Dig. 412 (1936)(Be.)
105  See wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 120-21 (Swiss employs primarily a proportionality theory); see also beDi, supra note 
28, at 183 (“[T]he Swiss courts surrendered only those fugitives whose acts were out of  proration to the political end 
sought or whose acts were not closely connected with purely political ends.”). 
106  See wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 120-26 (France looks primarily to the target).
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political only if  the actor directly injures the state.”107  Regardless of  the circumstances or the mo-
tivation of  the potential political offender, French courts only decide if  the target is substantially 
political in nature.108  The French objective test protects those who commit acts in the course of  
civil war or revolution, as long as the actions are not prohibited by the law of  war, even if  there are 
characteristics of  a common crime.109  
In re Giovanni Gatti is the controlling case for the French objective test.110  In the case, Gatti at-
tempted to murder a communist and sought protection from extradition in France.111  Taking a nar-
row view of  political offence, the court held that “the offence does not derive its political character 
from the motive of  the offender but from the nature of  the rights it injures.”112  In Gatti, the court 
chose to focus on the rights of  the injured rather than motives of  the perpetrator.113  In its pure 
form, the French objective test looks only to the nature of  the target to determine if  it is political, so 
that the crime may also be deemed political.114 
The French courts have at times adopted subjective elements, similar to the Swiss, but this ap-
pears to only be a momentary divergence.115  Recently, the French seem to be retreating from a sub-
jective element in the “objective” test and have focused again on the affected targets.116  The Court 
of  Appeal of  Paris recently declared in a political offender exception case, “[w]hatever the purpose 
pursued or the context in which such acts are located, they cannot, taking into account their serious-
ness, be considered as being of  a political character.”117  
A critique of  the French model is that the political offender exception is denied to those who 
do not commit attacks against political institutions.118  There is also the potential that an individual 
with purely financial or other criminal motives may be deemed a political offender simply because 
he or she attacks a state institution.119  However, in criminal law the motivation of  the offender, or 
further consequences of  the action, is rarely taken into account; the primary focus in on the mens rea 
107  Perry, supra note 11, at 721 (citing L.F.E. Goldie, The ‘Political Offense’ Exception and Extradition Between Democratic 
States, 13 ohio n.u.l. rev. 53, 62 (1986)).  
108  See wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 120-21 (noting that, for a time, France exclusively followed objective test). 
109  beDi, supra note 28, at 184. 
110  Perry, supra note 11, at 721. 
111  beDi, supra note 28, at 181-84 (citing In re Giovanni Gatti, 1947 Ann. Dig. 145 (1947)(Fr.)). 
112  Id. at 184. 
113  See wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 120-21 (using collaboration with the enemy as an example of  injured political 
rights).
114  Id.   
115  In the Da Palma case, the robbing of  the Portuguese National Bank was considered a political crime because it 
was committed by a revolutionary movement.  3 Da Palma Inacio, Court of  Appeal of  Paris. 14 December 1967, La 
Semaine Juridique No 15387. (1968), cited and discussed in Wijngaert, supra note 23, at 122-23.
116  Perry, supra note 11, at 722-23 (“[T]he French test concentrates on the affected target; the state.”). 
117  wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 124. 
118  See id. at 122 (“[O]n the one hand, the political character is denied to acts which do not constitute a direct attack 
against the political institutions.”). 
119  See id. at 122 (“[N]o distinction is made with respect to absolute political crimes committed from strictly personal 
motivation and no attention is paid to the seriousness of  the facts.”). 
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and the actus reus.120  By focusing purely on whether a target is sufficiently political, the French courts 
are adhering closely to the norms of  criminal law.121  Regardless of  the benefits of  the French test 
versus the Swiss test, the divergence of  views demonstrates why it is difficult to reach a uniform 
definition.122 
The relative political offence test in England has developed almost entirely through case law and 
is referred to as the “political incidence” test.123  English political thinkers first considered what was 
political, and found that there should be a political disturbance and the act should be part of  it.124  
This theory was put to practice in the landmark case In re Castioni.125  In 1890, Castioni was accused 
by Switzerland of  killing a public official during an armed political uprising and the Swiss requested 
that England extradite him for prosecution.126  Without providing an exact definition, the court 
found that Castioni’s conduct was a political offence because it was incidental to and part of  political 
uprising.127  
The definition of  political offence was further refined in Meunier case, in which France wanted 
extradition of  an anarchist who was allegedly responsible for two explosions that resulted in two 
individuals’ deaths.128  The Queen’s Bench refused to apply the political offence exception because 
the action did not involve “two or more parties in the state” and the offence was not in pursuit of  
a political objective.129  For sixty years the definition of  political offence in England required strict 
adherence to the requirement that a political action involve a conflict between two political parties or 
ideologies that were incident to that political uprising.130
The incidence test was broadened slightly in response to what the English courts perceived as a 
120  Id. at 126. 
121  See id. at 125-26 (highlighting the fact that criminal law does not take motivation into account); see also Perry, 
supra note 11, at 722-23 (noting that, in Piperno, the motivation of  a murder was not considered on the question of  
extradition). 
122  See beDi, supra note 28, at 184 (“[T]here is no single criterion to determine the nature and scope of  . . . relative 
political offenses . . . .”). 
123  wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 111. 
124  Id.  John Stuart Mill defined political crimes as “one committed in the course of  a civil war or common 
commotion.”  Id. (citing Ivan A. Shearer, extraDition in international law 169 (1971)).  Judge Stephen surmised 
that in addition a ‘political’ crime should be ‘incidental to’ and ‘part of  political disturbances’.  Id. (citing 2 J. stePhen, 
history oF CriMinal law 70-71 (1833)). 
125  Id. (citing In re Castioni, 1 Q.B.149 (1891), 5 brit. int’l l. Cases, 556 (1967)). 
126  Id.   
127  Id.   
128  Id. at 111-12 (citing In re Meunier, 2 Q.B. 415 (1894), 5 brit. int’l. l. Cases, 572 (1967)).
129  Id. (‘“[T]here must be two or more parties in the States, each seeking to impose the Government of  their own 
choice on the other and that offence is committed by one side or the other in pursuance of  that object . . . .’”). 
130  See id. (“[T]here must be two or more parties. . . each seeking to impose the Government of  their own choice on 
the other . . . .”); see also Perry, supra note 11, at 723-24 (noting that Great Britain added the “two-party struggle” test in In 
re Meunier). 
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new international world order in which countries could be in conflict without the outbreak of  war.131 
In Kolczysnki, seven Polish seamen mutinied and brought their ship into an English port seeking po-
litical asylum.132  Even though there was no political uprising in Poland in which the actions could be 
viewed as incident to, the court ruled the political exception applied because the crew was trying to 
protect themselves from prosecution of  a political nature.133  Thus, for England, a political offence 
no longer needs to be associated with a specific uprising, but merely relate to a political opposition 
between the fugitive and the requesting state.134
The English incidence test was transported across the Atlantic to the United States, similar to 
development and basis of  American common law.135  The American courts have developed a defini-
tion of  political offence, largely on Castioni, defining it as “any offence committed in the course of  
or furtherance of  civil war, insurrection, or political commotion.”136  However, American courts 
have not shown the same flexibility in expanding the incidence test as the English have, by sticking 
to the requirement that the offence must be incidence to a political struggle between two political 
parties.137  
In Jiminez v. Aristeguieta, the ex-President of  Venezuela, who was overthrown in a coup d’etat, 
was wanted by the new regime for prosecution for murder, attempted murder, and financial corrup-
tion during his presidency.138  The court held the financial crimes are not political offences because 
“[t]here is no evidence that the financial crimes charged were committed in the course of  and inci-
dentally to a revolutionary uprising or other violent political disturbance.”139  Under the American 
incidence test more is needed than politically motivated conduct.140  The political offender’s actions 
must be tied to a specific political uprising for him or her to have the political offender exception 
apply.141
131  See wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 112 (citing Regina v. Governor of  Brixton Prison, 21 I.L.R. 240 (1954) (UK) 
(at the time of  Casitioni, it was not treason for a citizen to leave his country and countries were not regarded as enemy 
countries when no war was in progress). 
132  Id.   
133  Id.   
134  See Perry, supra note 11, at 724 (“English ‘incidence’ test no longer demanded a specific uprising; only evidence of  
‘political opposition . . . between fugitive and requesting’ state.”).  
135  See id. at 724-25 (“The United States has generally followed the Castioni ‘incidence test’”).  
136  See wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 116 (citing In re Ezeta, 62 F., 978, 978 (N.D. Cal. 1894) (asserting that the Castioni 
principle was adopted “by analogy” in American jurisprudence).  
137  See id. at 116 (“The case law in the United States has not known the same flexible development as the British and 
is still anchored to the strict nineteenth century criteria of  Castioni and Meunier.”); see also Littenberg, supra note 56, at 
1217-18 (arguing that American courts are heavily focused on the uprising prong of  the political ‘incidence’ test). 
138  Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 553 (5th Cir. 1962). 
139  Id.   
140  See Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1104 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1036 (1980).  Mexico wanted the 
extradition of  an individual accused of  murder and attempted kidnapping of  the Cuban consul in Mexico. Id.  The court 
admitted the defendant’s actions were politically motivated, but granted extradition because of  the lack of  connection to 
a political uprising. Id.   
141  See wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 117-18 (the United States, unlike Britain, has not evolved since Castioni and there 
is an overemphasis on the requirement of  political uprising).  
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Although there is some international consensus regarding the definition of  political offence, 
especially pure political offences, the definition is far from uniform for relative political offences.142  
The French test focuses on the objective target of  the potential political offender, while the Swiss 
test is much more subjective in nature because it looks to the individual’s intent and proportionality 
of  the actions to that intent.143  The American and English incidence tests vary in strict adherence to 
the political uprising element.144  It is possible that what can be considered a relative political offence 
by the courts of  one country may be considered a common crime by other countries.145  Therefore, 
there is no a single criterion to determine the nature and the scope of  the relative political offence.146
The current lack of  a uniform political offence definition prevents the achievement of  the goals 
of  the political offender exception.  The political offence exception is necessary to preserve neutral-
ity to international struggles, support individuals in their attempts to form democratic and liberal 
governments, and prevent the potential unjust treatment that political offenders usually receive.147  
These goals are currently not being fully achieved.148  First, without a uniform definition it is hard 
for a nation to appear neutral because there is at least the perception that the definition of  political 
offence will be molded to fit the political objectives of  the state denying or granting extradition.149  
Second, a lack of  consensus on the political offender exception prevents full support of  citizens try-
ing to change their government.150  Wavering on whether to apply a subjective or objective test and 
on whether to require the movement be part of  an uprising, the political offence exception at times 
excludes individuals wishing for a liberal democracy and includes individuals supporting oppressive 
states.151  Finally, a state can surrender a political offender without violating any rules of  international 
human rights law, so there is not always adequate protection for individuals facing an unjust judicial 
system.152  
States are weary of  applying the political offence exception in an age of  increased terrorism and 
142  See beDi, supra note 28, at 182 (there is noteworthy cleavage concerning the definition of  relative political offence 
among different States). 
143  See supra notes 84-109 (discussing the French test for the political offence exception). 
144  See supra notes 110-128 (discussing the British-American test for the political offence exception). 
145  See beDi, supra note 28, at 184 (“It is quite probable that what is a relative political offence to the courts of  one 
country may be a common crime to those of  others.”). 
146  See id. at 184 (“[T]hese expositions clearly demonstrate that there is no single criterion to determine the nature and 
scope of  delits complexes or relative political offences.”). 
147  See Antje C. Petersen, Extradition and the Political Offence Exception in the Suppression of  Terrorism, 67 inD. l.J. 767, 775-
76 (1992).  
148  See Terry Richard Kane, Prosecuting International Terrorists in the United States Courts: Gaining the Jurisdictional Threshold, 
12 yale J. int’l l. 294, 317 (1987) (arguing that the explanation that states remain neutral in the internal power struggles 
of  the neighbors ignores that the decisions are made by the Executive and judiciary, partially political reasons). 
149  See id. (noting that a state may, under international law, always extradite criminals).
150  See id. (pointing out that some believe that people are entitled to “participate in political activity to change their 
government”).
151  See id. (“[T]he political offense exception, however, makes no theoretical distinction between rebels against 
oppressive states and political offenders in liberal democracies . . . .”). 
152  See id. at 316-17 (citing Codification of  International Law (Harvard Research in International law Project), 29 AM. 
J. intl’l l. 15, 66 (Supp. 1935) (Extradition)). 
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civil war that leads to even less uniform political offender definitions.153  Also, the lack of  consensus 
may lead to dangerous individuals finding safe haven and contributing to the destabilization of  their 
country, even if  their nation is a democratic one.154  Recognition of  the failure to uniformly define 
political offence will allow for the definition of  terrorism to be more clearly defined, because this 
demonstrates the reasons for the divergence in defining terrorism.155   
iv. PolitiCal oFFenCe exCePtion in ira Cases in the uniteD states
 One of  the best examples of  the inability to come to a consensus on who is a legitimate po-
litical offender and who is a terrorist can be seen in the Irish Republican Army (IRA) cases in the 
United States.156  In these cases, two nations have a very similar definition of  political offender 
based on bilateral treaties.157  Nonetheless, the United States refused on several occasions to extra-
dite members of  the IRA who sought refuge due to the political offender exception.158  England 
was infuriated that the political offender exception was being applied to individuals they considered 
terrorists.159  Looking at these cases and the bilateral treaty response will reveal how terrorism has 
consumed the political offender exceptions and the difficulties on coming to a consensus on defini-
tions for both.160 
An overly simplistic understanding of  the conflict surrounding the IRA is that it is based on 
whether six counties in Northern Ireland should remain in the United Kingdom or become part of  
the Republic of  Ireland.161  Depending on who is referencing the IRA, the organization is either a 
group of  freedom fighters engaged in a political struggle that comports exactly with the ideals of  
153  See Yakoob, supra note 53, at 563 (the resolve of  states to protect political offenders in the age of  terrorism and 
civil wars has weakened). 
154  See Joan Fitzpatrick, Rendition and Transfer in the War Against Terrorism: Guantanamo and Beyond, 25 Loy. l.a. int’l & 
CoMP. l. rev. 457, 471 (2003) (“Preventing terrorists from enjoying safe haven, thereby obtaining impunity for past and 
future crimes, is an objective of  counterterrorism.”).
155  It is widely contested whether terrorism is a true international crime or as merely a condemned action that may be 
crystallized into an international crime in the future.  See generally Creegan, supra note 3, at 243-45. 
156  See generally Banoff, supra note 27, at 169-70 (“Much of  the debate has focused on three recent decisions involving 
extradition of  accused terrorists.”)
157  The United Kingdom and the United States both rely on the political incidence test to define a relative political 
offence.  See wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 117-18 (the United States and the United Kingdom’s use the political incidence 
test); see also Banoff, supra note 27, at 169-70 (political offender exception is based on treaty law between the United 
Kingdom and the United States). 
158  Id.   
159  See Margaret I. Branick, Extradition and the Conflict in Northern Ireland: The Past, Present and Future of  an Intractable 
Problem, 25 hastings int’l & CoMP. l. rev. 169, 169-70 (2002) (noting how “British government resentment” and 
“foreign policy concerns” prompted the United States to eliminated the political offence exception for many types of  
crimes).
160  See Fitzpatrick, supra note 154, at 468-71 (noting that extradition law and terrorism have a complex relationship 
in which the political offence exception has been transformed due revisions in statutes and jurisprudence based on 
concerns that terrorists would escape prosecution). 
161  Id. at 170.  The conflict also involves history, identity, religion, culture, security, and human rights.  Id.   
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political offender exception or a group of  terrorists.162  
The United States and the United Kingdom share a long history of  cooperation, as well as 
overlap, in the area of  extradition.163  Britain’s landmark extradition case for the political offender 
exception became the cornerstone for American extradition law.164  In 1889, England and the Unit-
ed States signed a Supplementary Treaty that prevented extradition of  political offenders.165  The 
preclusion of  extradition of  political offenders remained mostly intact in the 1972 Supplementary 
Treaty, which stipulated that extradition did not extend to political offences.166  
Complications in applying the political offender exception began to occur due to the rising 
prevalence of  the IRA.167  The United Kingdom wanted to extradite several IRA members who fled 
to the United States and labeled the actions of  the members outside of  the scope of  the political 
offender exception.168  The United States judiciary applied the political offence exception in these 
situations based on the 1972 Treaty and previous case law surrounding the incidence test and re-
fused extradition.169  The United States may have also been influenced by the Irish community in the 
United States, which sympathized with the IRA’s cause.170  For some, it was particularly baffling that 
the United States was willing to shelter several IRA members while extraditing members of  the Pal-
estine Liberation Organization.171  At the height of  the IRA cases, three major cases for extradition 
were tried in the United States courts.172
In the first of  the three major cases, Britain sought the extradition of  Peter McMullen, a former 
British army officer accused of  bombing a British army barrack in 1974 as a member of  the IRA.173  
A federal magistrate denied the extradition request because his actions were within the scope of  the 
162  See id. at 171-72 (identifying the different perceptions of  the IRA, both domestically and internationally). 
163  See id. at 180-85 (the United Kingdom and the United States have a series of  extradition treaties); see also 
wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 112 (the United States and United Kingdom both use political incidence test).
164  See supra notes 123-29 (discussing the British creation and American importation of  the Castioni test). 
165  John Patrick Groarke, Revolutionaries Beware: The Erosion of  the Political Offense Exception Under the 1986 United States-
United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty, 136 u. Pa. l. rev. 1515, 1517 (1988).   
166  See id. (noting that the 1972 treaty contains twenty-nine extraditable offences, but excludes political offenders); 
Extradition Treaty Between the Government of  the United States of  America and the Government of  the United 
Kingdom of  Great Britain and Northern Ireland, June 8, 1972, U.S., art. V, 28 U.S.T. 227 [hereinafter 1972 Treaty].  
The 1972 Treaty entered into force on January 21, 1977 (“Extradition shall not be granted if  . . . the offense for which 
extradition is requested . . . one of  a political character.”). Id. 
167  See Branick, supra note 159, at 180-82 (identifying the applications of  the 1972 Treaty regarding the IRA). 
168  Id. at 181-82. 
169  Id.
170  See Aaron J. Noteboom, Terrorism: I Know It When I See It, 81 or. l. rev. 553,  558 (2002) (“[T]he Irish Republican 
Army openly collected hundreds of  thousands of  dollars in funds each year from Irish-Americans through Irish 
Northern Aid (NORAID) until pressure by the British government forced the United States to crack down on the 
organization.”). 
171  See Petersen, supra note 147, at 787 (contrasting the decision to shelter IRA members while continuing to extradite 
PLO members). 
172  See generally McMullen v. INS, 788 F. 2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986) (questioning whether an IRA members act of  violence 
were sufficiently linked to the organization’s political objective); In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981) (same); In re 
Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (same).
173  McMullen, 788 F. 2d at 593. 
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political offence exception of  the 1972 Treaty.174  The magistrate based his decision on the incidence 
test, finding that McMullen was a member of  the IRA and the violence was for political ends, so that 
the crimes were “incidental to and formed as part of  a political disturbance, uprising or insurrection 
in furtherance thereof.”175  The finding of  the court angered the British government, which argued 
that there was not a state of  insurrection in the United Kingdom, and thus the actions fell outside 
of  the scope of  the political offender exception.176 
England became frustrated with the application of  the political offender exception again in In re 
Mackin.177  In that case, Desmond Mackin was wanted for the attempted murder of  a British soldier 
in Belfast in 1978.178  Once again the magistrate denied the request, citing the incidence test to find 
that the political offence exception was not limited to pure political offences, but also extended to 
relative political offences.179  Furthermore, Mackin’s offences were incidental to his role in the IRA’s 
uprising in Belfast.180  Again, the United States refused extradition of  an alleged terrorist by Eng-
land’s standards.181
In one of  the final applications of  the political offender exception in the IRA cases, a federal 
court refused extradition of  an IRA member in In re Doherty.182  Joseph Doherty had escaped from 
a prison and was convicted in absentia of  murdering a British soldier.183  The court attempted to 
narrow the traditional political incidence test, finding that it was not enough there was a political 
conflict in Northern Ireland and Doherty’s offence was in furtherance of  the conflict.184  The court 
added an additional step to the analysis: it would look to “the nature of  the act, the context in which 
it is committed, the status of  the party committing the act, the nature of  the organization on whose 
behalf  it is committed, and the particularized circumstance of  the place where the act takes place.”185 
However, the court still denied extradition by applying the political incidence test and finding 
Doherty met the additional requirement based on the circumstances of  the offence.186   
Besides the additional constriction of  the political offence exception that the Southern Dis-
trict Court of  New York imposed, the United States judiciary appeared to be willing to restrict the 
174  Id.   
175  Branick, supra note 159, at 180-82 (citing McMullen, reprinted in 132 Cong. Rec. S16,585-86).  Eventually, the 
Ninth circuit granted extradition stating McMullen was ineligible for asylum or withholding deportation.  McMullen, 788 
F.2d at 592. 
176  See Banoff, supra note 27, at 185 (the court’s finding of  a state of  insurrection in one of  the United State’s closest 
allies angered the British, as well as the U.S. Departments of  Justice and State). 
177  See id. (the U.S. court again refused to extradite a member of  the IRA).   
178  Mackin, 668 F.2d at 124.
179  Id. at 125. 
180  Id. The Second Circuit refused to issue a writ of  mandamus to reverse the holding finding the magistrate’s 
decision was not appealable.  Id. at 137. 
181  See Banoff, supra note 27, at 185 (stating that the United Kingdom denied there was a state of  insurrection). 
182  Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 270.
183  Id. at 272.
184  Id. at 274-75. 
185  Id. at 275. 
186  Id.  Eventually, Doherty was deported after the Supreme Court review the case.  See generally INS v. Doherty, 502 
U.S. 314 (1992). 
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incidence test in certain circumstances.187  In Quinn v. Robinson,188 a magistrate found that the conflict 
in Northern Ireland did not meet the requirement of  the political incidence test.189  A district court 
reversed the magistrate court’s finding, but the Ninth Circuit reinstated the decision, finding there 
was no uprising because the violence had been exported outside of  a set geographic region.190  This 
would be one of  the last applications of  the political offender test based on the 1972 Supplementary 
Treaty.191
 Pressure began to mount on multiple fronts for the United States to restrict the political offend-
er exception.192  There was growing concern among the Justice Department and within the Reagan 
administration that terrorists would seek safe haven in the United States.193  Also, the United States 
was in jeopardy of  damaging relations with Britain and potentially other nations.194  Britain and the 
United States generally enjoyed a close relationship,195 but the U.S. application of  the political of-
fender exception threatened Britain’s willingness to surrender fugitives to the United States and the 
American-English pact in extradition.196 
To counter the potential fallout, and at the urging of  England, a Supplementary Treaty was 
added to existing extradition treaty in 1985.197  The 1985 Supplementary Treaty narrowed the politi-
cal offender exception to exclude the crimes of  murder, assault causing grievous bodily harm, kid-
napping, abduction, the taking of  hostages, and any offence involving the use of  a bomb, grenade, 
rocket, firearm, letter or parcel bomb, or any incendiary device to endanger a person.198  There was 
no distinction made whether the acts are directed at a soldier or civilian or if  the acts are committed 
187  Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 783 (9th Cir. 1986). 
188  Id.
189  Id. at 813-14. 
190  Id.   
191  See Branick, supra note 159, at 184-86 (asserting that the tensions between the United States and the United 
Kingdom led to a limited application of  the political offender exception). 
192  See id. (considering that President Reagan worried about the relations between Britain and the United States 
concerning extradition issues); see also Banoff, supra note 27, at 185 (noting the United Kingdom’s concern over the lack 
of  IRA extradition). 
193  See Branick, supra note 159, at 185 (the Reagan administration did not want the United States to become a terrorist 
“haven”). 
194  See id. (stating the administration was concerned about “foreign relations in general”).   
195  See Banoff, supra note 27, at 185 (noting that Britain was a “long-standing ally” to the United States).
196  See id. (stating that the McMullen, Mackin, and Doherty decisions “angered the British government”). 
197  See Todd M. Sailer, The International Criminal Court: An Argument to Extend Its Jurisdiction to Terrorism and a Dismissal of  
U.S. Objections, 13 teMP. int’l & CoMP. L.J. 311, 336 (1999) (stating that the treaty revisions were urged by the British, to 
enable them to better pursue IRA members who committed acts of  violence). 
198  Supplementary Treaty Between the United States of  America and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, T.I.A.S. 12050, 1556 U.N.T.S. 369 (eff. Dec. 23, 1986) [hereinafter 1985 
Supplementary Treaty]. 
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pursuant to a political revolution.199  Essentially, the 1985 Supplementary Treaty only allows for the 
political offender exception to apply to nonviolent political actions, which are basically pure political 
offences.200 
The 1985 Supplementary Treaty is an overreaction to the failure to properly come to a consen-
sus on a definition the political offender exception and terrorism.201  The United States attempted 
to negotiate similar agreements with other democratic nations.202  “[I]t all but erodes the peoples’ 
right to self-determination embodied in Article 1 of  the U.N. Charter.”203  The 1985 Supplementary 
Treaty also takes the power to make decisions out of  the hands of  the judiciary by limiting an exami-
nation of  the accused’s political motives.204  Finally, the 1985 Supplementary Treaty politicizes the 
extradition process by moving the process to purely bilateral agreements.205  If  the Supplementary 
Treaty is further extended to other nations, it could eventually lead to the destabilizing of  foreign 
relations because nations would be applying an emaciated political offender exception to allies while 
preserving it for others.206  The lack of  definition of  the political offender exception, like the failure 
to define terrorism, leads to uncertainty and a lack of  uniform application.207  
v. asyluM law anD the PolitiCal oFFenDer exCePtion 
Asylum law in many ways intertwines with the political offender exception, both in its ideal form 
and in its application.208  Asylum law developed largely out of  the political offender exception.209  
However, there are certainly some differences between the two areas.210  The lack of  uniformity in 
199  See id.  The words “civilian” and “solider” are never mentioned in the 1985 Supplementary Treaty and instead 
numerous violent offences are merely listed as being outside of  the scope of  the political offence exception.  Therefore, 
on the face of  the statute it does not appear to matter whether an individual commits a violent offence against a civilian 
or a soldier.  See Sailer, supra note 197, at 336 (The 1985 Supplementary Treaty “makes no distinction based upon 
whether the acts are directed at a civilian or a soldier, or whether the acts are committed in the midst of  a political 
revolution”). 
200  See id. at 336 (the political offence exception between the two nations effectively restricts the exception to 
nonviolent political action). 
201  See id. (“The subsequent U.S.-U.K. response to these decisions exemplifies the troublesome role that politics 
sometimes plays in the international legal arena.”).
202  Id.  
203  Id. at 337 (citing U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2).  Article 1 reads, “The Purposes of  the United Nations are: To 
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of  equal rights and self-determination of  
peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.” Id.
204  Branick, supra note 159, at 192.
205  See id. (the Supplementary Treaty usurps the judiciary’s tradition role in evaluating extradition requests and 
politicizes the extradition process). 
206  See id. (“[T]he Treaty bars crimes commonly committed by paramilitary groups from being political offenses.”)
207  See Petersen, supra note 147, at 788 (arguing that attempting to locate terrorism on a “scale of  acceptable political 
struggle” causes “uncertainty [to] clash[] with uncertainty”).
208  See Matthew E. Price, Politics or Humanitarianism? Recovering the Political Roots of  Asylum, 19 geo. iMMirg. l.J. 227, 
305 (2005) (noting that asylum has been seen as a “haven” for political dissidents).
209  See id. at 305-09 (noting that France was the first state to assert a “principle of  asylum for political offenders”). 
210  See id. at 308-09 (highlighting how asylum and extradition are now independent doctrinal fields). 
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both the political offender exception and asylum law opens up the possibility of  unjust prosecution 
of  legitimate political offenders.211  The failure to have a uniform policy of  asylum and a political 
offender exception also prevents the opportunity to support the human rights of  those caught up in 
an oppressive regimes.212
There is no duty to extradite under international law, so the exception not to extradite is mostly 
carved out as part of  extradition bilateral treaties.213  The development of  asylum law, in the modern 
international order, was established out of  the political offender exception law in treaties during the 
nineteenth century.214  Asylum law became intertwined with the political offender exception because 
the original purpose of  both was to prevent persecution of  individuals for political offences they 
committed in their home countries.215  
However, asylum law has developed a broader scope than the political offender exception by 
protecting refugees from all forms of  persecution.216  For example, Canada offers protection to 
“persons in needs of  protection” who face a substantial risk of  torture or other individual risk to 
their lives.217  In addition, immigration policy has tightened peoples’ ability to migrate; asylum law 
has developed as a relief  to the restrictions on migration when individuals are in serious harm to 
threats of  life or freedom.218  There are numerous other reasons for asylum beyond the political of-
fender exception, such as promotion of  religious freedom, stopping gender persecution, and easing 
birthing restrictions.219  While this paper cannot go into all the points of  divergence, it is worth not-
ing that asylum law has expanded beyond the political offender exception to include multiple forms 
of  human rights protections.220  The protection of  individuals from prosecution and potential abuse 
is the basic component that remains true to the political offender exception and asylum law.221
The development of  asylum law is partially due to the failure of  the political offender exception 
to adequately protect individuals from prosecution from oppressive regimes.222  However, the focus 
211  See id. (“[I]n a world of  closed borders, a refusal to admit can be functionally equivalent to a decision to extradite . 
. . .”).
212  See PriCe, supra note 22, at 70-73 (worrying that nations might be unwilling to grant asylum to people persecuted 
by friendly countries “for fear of  damaging good relations”). 
213  See Kane, supra note 148, at 315 (no rule of  customary international law requires a state to comply with an 
extradition request and it usually arises out of  a bilateral treaty). 
214  Yakoob, supra note 53, at 550-51.  Asylum also has its roots in ancient Greece for those that had to travel outside 
of  their own state.  See PriCe, supra note 22, at 26-30.  Under Roman law, which was carried into the Middle Ages, asylum 
was also granted to slaves in certain circumstances.  See id. at 31-35.
215  See id. at 52 (noting that the original purpose of  asylum law was to prevent “unjust punishment” of  fugitives). 
216  See id. at 69-73 (showing that asylum law can also be used to condemn oppressive nations). 
217  Immigration and Refugee Protection Act ch. 27, § 97(1) (2012). 
218  See Price, supra note 22, at 107-08 (defining persecution as the threat of  “serious harm”). 
219  See id. at 108-22 (demonstrating the importance of  the ability to criticize a governmental regime without the fear 
of  punishment). 
220  See id. at 47-53, 200 (noting the shift in asylum law away from criminal justice, towards the “promotion of  
substantive political morality”).
221  See PriCe, supra note 22, at 308-09 (noting that asylum decisions turned on the justification for the punishment). 
222  See id. at 52-57 (asserting that sheltering individuals from persecution can be seen as a “legitimate response to 
pervasive autocracy”).
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on asylum is now vested more in protection from deportation rather than showing support of  the 
political struggles of  individuals over nondemocratic regimes.223  There is a high potential for restric-
tions to be placed on asylum for reasons beyond support of  political offenders, such as economics 
or anti-immigrant fervor because asylum laws are so heavily based in immigration policy.224  This 
leads to legitimate political offenders being barred from protection and thereby potentially prevent-
ing them from spreading democratic ideals.225  
On the other side of  the spectrum, the rise of  asylum law at the submergence of  the political 
offender exception leads to concern that potential terrorists will seek haven in nations due to the 
flood of  asylum applications and confusion over the benefits of  supporting political offenders.226  
Asylum law is beneficial to the ideal that certain refugees deserve protection.227  Yet, the broadening 
of  asylum law, due to the vague and mostly inoperable political offender exception has led to the rise 
of  asylum, which fails to adequately support the ideals of  the exception of  extradition for political 
offenders.228 
vi. the exCePtion to the exCePtion: DeFining terrorisM 
As international terrorism becomes more pervasive, the trouble in defining the political of-
fence exception leads to difficultly in prosecution and international cooperation.229  The divergence 
of  views for the political offender exception partially reveals why there is a lack of  consensus on 
the definition of  terrorism.230  States are unable to agree on what constitutes a political crime that 
is worthy of  the political offender exception partially because of  the development of  case law, but 
also because the views of  which offenders meet the ideal of  a revolutionary figure fighting against 
tyranny.231  Currently, there are multiple exceptions to the political offender exception, including the 
exclusion of  certain nonpolitical crimes, war crimes, genocide, collaboration with the enemy, and acts 
223  See id. at 58 (arguing that the function of  the two is the same). 
224  See id. at 85-93 (illustrating the danger of  the politicizing of  asylum). 
225  See id. at 93-94 (humanitarian approach to asylum has encouraged the perception that asylum offers nothing to the 
receiving states other than moral satisfaction). 
226  See Sailer, supra note 197, at 346 (“Fairness for the accused would be greatly enhanced, and distrust among nations 
would no longer result in “safe havens” for terrorists.”).   
227  See Fitzpatrick, supra note 154, at 473 (“Irregular rendition, especially when it takes the form of  summary 
expulsion or abduction, deprives the subject of  an opportunity to enjoy protection from potential persecution and 
serious human rights violations.”). 
228  See Price, supra note 208, at 308 (“today extradition and asylum have developed as doctrinally separate area of  
law”); id. at 299. (“This approach dampens the need for moral-political judgment by allowing states of  refuge to remain 
agnostic about whether a suppliant actually deserves protection.  In other words, it counsels a systematic overprotection 
of  fugitives for the purpose of  reducing political conflict.”).
229  Perry, supra note 11, at 730 (“As transactional terrorism spreads, it becomes increasingly apparent that the 
mechanisms of  international law relating to the control and punishment of  such acts are in disarray.”). 
230  See id. at 731 (acknowledging that the current state of  the definition does not please anyone).
231  See beDi, supra note 28, at 184 (decisions by courts for the political offender exception are clearly influenced by 
the policies of  their respective governments). 
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of  terrorism.232  
Terrorism, the exception to the exception, arose almost immediately after the political offender 
exception was formed, as discussed previously in section III, in the attentat clause.233  In the 1890s, 
anarchists, who sought the overthrow of  government in all forms, were deemed to be outside of  the 
political offender exception.234  However, the exception to the exception was not limited to anar-
chists; anyone who attempted to take the life of  a head of  state was deemed not to be engaged in a 
sufficiently political action.235  
The desire to protect heads of  states and extradite individuals who attempted assassinations can 
be seen as the international community’s first attempt to define terrorism in the League of  Na-
tions’ Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of  Terrorism.236  The Convention was also 
in response to the political pressure the League of  Nations faced after the assassination by Croatian 
separatists of  King Alexander I of  Yugoslavia.237  Article 2 of  the Convention states that terror-
ism constitutes “any willful act causing death or grievous bodily harm or loss of  liberty” to head 
of  states, the wives or husbands of  heads of  states, and persons charged with public functions (or 
holding public positions) when the act is directed against them in their public capacity.238  After first 
addressing attacks on the heads of  states, the Convention also deemed acts of  terrorism to include 
the willful destruction of  public property and willful acts intended to endanger the lives of  the 
members of  the public.239  It is noteworthy that states were careful to implicitly exclude armed forces 
and actions committed during civil wars from the Convention.240  The Convention also required the 
criminalization of  terrorism by each nation, a reflection that persists in modern international terror-
ism treaties.241
The Convention failed on multiple fronts to truly address how to deal with terrorism and recon-
232  See Yakoob, supra note 53, at 562  (“Crimes such as attempts on the lives of  heads of  state, war crimes, genocide, 
collaboration with the enemy, and acts of  terrorism generally trump the political offence  exception.”). 
233  See supra notes 49-51; see also Phillips, supra note 16, at 341 (“This new definition carved out several ‘exceptions to 
the exception,’ with the most notable being the attentat clause which stated that attempts on the life of  the head of  state 
was not sufficiently political so as to refuse extradition.”). 
234  See id. at 341 (arguing that states “solved” the problem of  anarchists by adopting a restrictive definition of  
“political”). 
235  See id. (attempts on the life of  the head of  state was not sufficiently political so as to refuse extradition). 
236  Convention for the Prevention of  Terrorism League of  Nations, Nov. 16, 1937, L.N. Doc. C.546M.383.1937 (this 
Convention was never entered into force)[hereinafter Convention for the Prevention of  Terrorism].
237  See saul, supra note 6, at 171 (noting that this was the “most significant early modern attempt to define 
terrorism”).  In 1934 King Alexander, was assassinated by Croatian separatists while on a State visit to France.  The 
suspects fled to Italy and sought protection from extradition under the political offender exception.  The Court of  
Appeal of  Turin refused to extradite the suspects and held “the assassination of  a sovereign is a political crime if  it is 
promoted by political motives.”  Id. (citing In re Pavelic 1933-1934 Ann. Dig.  372 (1934)(It.); benJaMin FerenCz, 1 an 
international CriMinal Court: a steP towarD worlD PeaCe – a DoCuMentary history anD analysis, halF a 
Century oF hoPe 48 (1980).
238  Convention for the Prevention of  Terrorism, art. 2.  
239  Id.
240  saul, supra note 6, at 173. 
241  See id. (Article 2 enumerates the criminal acts which States must criminalize). 
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cile it with the political offence exception.242  It only attracted signatories from twenty-four nations, 
including only one colonial state.243  The Second World War also took attention from the Conven-
tion, and it was never entered into force with the demise of  the League of  Nations.244  Even if  it did 
succeed, the Convention’s usefulness was always doubtful because the “extradition provisions did 
not exclude terrorism from the political offence exception.”245  States were unwilling to restrict their 
sovereignty for extradition matters, including political offences, despite the fact that the political 
offence exception is a matter compromised in treaty law.246  However, the Convention was still the 
first, and arguably the best, attempt ever made at reaching an international consensus on terrorism.247 
It is significant that Convention was created specifically to respond to problems with the political 
offender exception and that the potential complications in implementing the Convention were based 
largely on differing views on extradition.248
The International Law Commission (ILC) made the next major attempt to codify an interna-
tional definition for terrorism in the 1954 Draft Code of  Offences against the Peace and Security 
of  Mankind.249  Some ILC members found references to terrorism too vague and believed that the 
League of  Nations Convention failed to comport with modern understandings of  terrorism.250  De-
spite the obvious need to reform the definition of  terrorism, the ILC was unsuccessful in reaching 
a consensus.251  The ILC was able to pass a resolution condemning terrorism and made an attempt 
to address terrorism on an international level.252  However, the failure to come to a consensus on a 
definition of  terrorism is a feature of  international law that continues to this day.253  
An attempt was made again to define terrorism on the international level in the drafting of  the 
242  See saul, supra note 6, at 175 (claiming that the utility of  the convention was “always doubtful”).
243  Id. at 173 (the Convention was ratified by twelve European States, seven Caribbean, Central or South American 
States, and five other major states from other regions.  India is the only colonial state to ratify the treaty).  
244  Id.   
245  Id. at 175.
246  See id. (“[m]any states were reluctant to confine their sovereign discretion in extradition matters, including the 
scope of  political offences . . . .”). 
247  See id. (the Convention served as a definitional benchmark in later debates). 
248  See id. at 173 (stating that the Convention was ratified by twelve European States, seven Caribbean, Central or 
South American States, and five other major states from other regions.  India is the only colonial state to ratify the 
treaty).  
249  See generally 1954 ILC Draft Code of  Offences Against the Peace and Security of  Mankind (Part I), in ILC 6th 
Sess. Report (3 Jun-28 July 1954), UN Doc A/2693, as requested by UNGA Resolution 177(II) (1947) [hereinafter: 1954 
ILC Draft Code].  
250  See saul, supra note 6, at 177.  “[S]ome ILC members found references to terrorism too vague unless linked to 
the ‘excellent’ 1937 definition.  Id. (citing Summary Records of  the 2d Sess., 1 y.b. int’l l. CoMM’n 127, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SER.A/1950 (Hudson, Francois)).  A 1951 draft that included the League of  Nations disappeared after it was 
determined to be antiquated, especially when compared to modern terrorist activities.  Id. (citing Summary Records of  
the 2d Sess., 1 y.b. int’l l. CoMM’n 127, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950, 63 (Alfaro and Kerno, respectively)).   
251  See id. at 178 (the ILC could not reach a consensus on the definition of  aggression).
252  See id. at 176-78 (the article on terrorism was adopted by ten votes to zero, with three abstentions). 
253  See id. at 180-90 (the General Assembly resolution makes no reference to terrorism). 
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1998 Draft Rome Statute at the 1998 Rome Diplomatic Conference.254  However, the attempt to 
define terrorism on an international level was dropped because there was no internationally accepted 
definition of  the crime of  terrorism and no universal jurisdiction for crimes of  terrorism.255  The 
main reason articulated for the lack of  definition was that “[c]rimes that do not carry universal juris-
diction are fundamentally different from those that do”; no universal jurisdiction crimes, like terror-
ism, do not deserve the “. . . lofty place in the hierarchy of  inherently criminal acts.”256  It is striking 
that the exception to the political offender exception is not considered, by some in the international 
community, to rise to the level of  a universal international crime.257  
vii. why DeFine terrorisM?
At this point it is fair to ask whether it is really worth it to define terrorism on the international 
level?  After all, the international community has functioned without a consensus on an international 
definition of  terrorism for decades.258  Terrorism often has features of  a common crime that are 
difficult to splice from a political action, so it might best be handled at the state level.259  However, 
there are at least five major reasons to define terrorism.260  
First, the failure to define terrorism leads to the straining of  international relations. Similar to the 
inability to define the political offender exception, specifically in the IRA cases in the United States, 
foreign relations are damaged when real differences arise on how to define terrorism.261  Without at 
least some consensus on a definition of  terrorism, the political offender exception runs the risk of  
being largely eliminated replaced with an overly broad definition of  terrorism that includes any form 
of  unconventional political action.262  For example, the 1985 Supplemental Treaty, which gutted the 
political offender exception between the United States and England, is even broader than the Euro-
pean Convention on the Suppression of  Terrorism, which has been labeled as overly broad.263
254  See Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court., July 17, 1998-Dec. 31, 2000, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter 
Rome Statute];  see also 1998 Draft Rome Statute, Art 5, in Official Records of  the UN Diplomatic Conference of  
Plenipotentiaries on an ICC, Rome, 15 June-17 July 1999, UN Doc A/CONF.183/12, vol. III, 21 [hereinafter Draft of  
Rome Statute]. 
255  See Creegan, supra note 3, at 244-45 (stating that including crimes which did not have a clear status would prevent 
the ratification of  the Rome Statute).
256  Id. at 245. 
257  See id. (noting that the negotiators of  the Rome Statute recognized that terrorism and treaty crime is not 
universally recognized as a violation of  the law). 
258  See saul, supra note 6, at 12-13 (positing that the definition of  terrorism has changed over time based on historical 
and political context).
259  Id. at 11 (claiming that there must be an explanation as to why the international community should classify 
terrorism as an international crime).
260  See generally Sailer, supra note 197, at 333-36 (analyzing the short-comings of  an ad hoc approach to the definition 
of  terrorism).
261  See id. at 336 (describing the United Sates’ actions during the time of  IRA and PLO bombings, and impact of  
these actions on international relations).
262  See id. at 336-37 (elaborating on the failed efforts to eliminate the political offender exception).
263  Id. at 336.
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Second, without a universal definition of  terrorism, the field of  asylum law becomes even more 
vague, increasing the possibility that those who threaten the lives and safety of  people the world 
over will not be prosecuted.264  Asylum law submerges the political offender exception because 
courts are less likely to examine whether an individual is truly a terrorist who does not deserve 
protection, or rather an individual who has committed a political offence that is a legitimate form of  
political violence.265  Thus, asylum law becomes vaguer without a uniform definition of  terrorism, 
making it more likely terrorists will not be properly extradited.266 
Third, failing to define terrorism prevents a classification of  activities that are legitimate forms 
of  violent resistance to political oppression.267  Democratic nations will still seek to protect those 
who are persecuted by granting asylum, but this goal will be hindered as these nations will be pres-
sured into limiting who is classified as political offenders since they will be lumped into the same cat-
egory as other potential refugees and migrants.268  Defining the limitations of  terrorism gives states 
the ability to discourage excessive means of  reaching political goals.269  Terrorists frequently attempt 
to bring a voice to their cause, and if  their actions are condemned by the international community 
as being improper means of  political action, they may be motivated to pursue nonviolent means.270  
Defining terrorism also allows the true revolutionaries, who fight against oppressive regimes, to 
be considered separately from the damning label of  terrorists.271  Some might say that a definition 
of  terrorism is too political.  Yet, it is a mistake for any law against terrorism to “remain neutral in 
respect to competing values, and claims.”272  
Fourth, a loose definition of  terrorism allows for any potential political opposition to a country 
to be painted as a terrorist group, even if  those individuals are pursuing legitimate means of  op-
264  See id. at 333 (elaborating on the “incidence test” used to constitute a political offence as an intentionally vague 
test to allow judicial discretion).
265  See id. at 335 (stating that politics would play a larger role in interpretation of  the political offender exception than 
ordinary criminological considerations).
266  See id. at 335 (claiming that the strong political influence in the interpretation of  the political offender exception 
would lead states to deny extradition to further their own political objectives).
267  See saul, supra note 6, at 317 (“Unless a pacifist position is accepted, any international definition of  terrorism 
must ensure that legitimate forms of  violent resistance to political oppression are not internationally criminalized.”).
268  See PriCe, supra note 22, at 93-94 (declaring humanitarian approach to asylum has encouraged the perception that 
asylum offers nothing to the receiving states other than moral satisfaction).
269  See saul, supra note 6, at 316-17 (providing that limitations on the definition of  terrorism would allow regular legal 
responses). 
270  See id. at 316 (stating that the political process discourages violence).
271 See niCholas n. kittrie, rebels with a Cause: the MinDs anD Morality oF PolitiCal oFFenDers 340 (2000) 
(stating that it is important to distinguish revolutionaries from terrorist by creating typology outlines of  political 
offenders which can “be concretely  and objectively applied to virtually all categories of  actors taking part in political 
conflicts . . . .”).
272  saul, supra note 6, at 16 (citing M. CheriF. bassiouni, CriMes against huManity in international CriMinal law 
485 (1992)). 
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position.273  “[A] government that defines the term [terrorism] vaguely or overly-broad risks having 
its applications of  the term ignored.”274  While this is similar to the last point, some nations go too 
far and label even pure political acts as terrorism.275  These nations label those engaged in political 
protests through nonviolent means or even opposition party members as terrorists.276  Those that 
fall under the umbrella of  what some wish to call terrorists could even include industrial activists or 
migrants.277  Without a definition of  terrorism, the category can encompass those who should be 
protected under the political offender exception to extradition, including those who have committed 
a pure political offence.278  
Finally, there cannot be prosecution for a crime without a definition of  the offence.279  Without 
a definition of  both terrorism and permissible conduct, individuals are not on sufficient notice as to 
what conduct is prohibited.280  This final reason touches on the previous four reasons for defining 
terrorism.  After all, one cannot base international policy and consensus, asylum and extradition law, 
and treaties and agreements on vague definitions without granting an excessive amount of  discre-
tion to those who are currently in a position of  power.281  The lack of  an immutable characteristic of  
terrorism, and the political nature in definition, demonstrates that a definition should be pursued.282  
A definition of  terrorism is necessary and it can be reached by looking to the original purpose of  
defining terrorism: the political offender exception.
273  See Colin Warbrick, The European Response to Terrorism in an Age of  Human Rights, 15 eur. J. int’l l. 989, 1002-03 
(2004) (“[T]he looser the definition, the more useful the concept to tar the political opponent, the industrial activist, the 
unpopular migrant as ‘terrorist’ and then proceed against him without restraint: or not.”).
274  Perry, supra note 2, at 274. 
275  See Petersen, supra note 147, at 769 (stating current definitions of  terrorism make it virtually impossible to 
distinguish between nonviolent political actors and terrorists).
276  See id. (arguing that terrorists can pursue a broad range of  goals). 
277  See Warbrick, supra note 273, at 1002-03 (recognizing the usefulness of  a looser definition of  terrorism that allows 
for an easier attack on political or social minorities and migrants).
278  Id. at 990.
279  See Perry, supra note 11, at 270 (“[C]onflicting definitions [of  terrorism] create a problem of  notice because 
individuals are uncertain if  which definition applies to them and thus when conduct is prohibited” of  terrorism applies 
to them). 
280 See id. (stating that with conflicting definitions, individuals will not be able to identify actions that could be 
terrorism).
281  See Creegan, supra note 3, at 244-45 (attention for defining terrorism has waned leading to negative stating that the 
lack of   an consensus on the definition of  terrorism prevented its inclusion in the Rome Statue); Sailer, supra note 197, 
at 336 (suggesting vague definitions of  terrorism has led to a category that encompasses almost any form of  political 
struggle); PriCe, supra note 22, at 93-94 (noting the humanitarian approach to asylum has encouraged the perception 
that asylum offers nothing to the receiving states other than moral satisfaction); Warbrick, supra note 273, at 1002-
03 (reasoning that nonviolent political actors and those fighting against oppressive regimes are being included in the 
definition of  terrorism). 
282  See saul, supra note 6, at 16 (advocating that the international community needs to have certain definitions to 
properly label certain conduct as just and other conduct as unjust). 
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viii. DeFinition oF terrorisM 
Terrorism is the exception to political offender exception.283  A definition of  terrorism can be 
reached by looking to the original purposes for the creation of  the exception to the political of-
fender exception, as well as current definitions of  political offence. 284  The definition of  terrorism 
can further be developed by analyzing where there has been some consensus on a definition of  ter-
rorism.285  Finally, additional considerations, such as the modern nature of  terrorism and the political 
reality of  coming to a consensus, will be taken into account when forming a definition.  The task 
of  defining terrorism additionally requires identifying what is not terrorism by defining political of-
fence.286 
The restrictions of  the political offence exception and attempts to suppress terrorism have been 
mostly spread through bilateral treaties.287  The definition of  political offender that has recently aris-
en out of  the treaties is extremely broad, such as the definition in the 1985 Supplementary Treaty.288  
The major criticism of  the 1985 Treaty is that a political offence is too narrow, making the definition 
of  terrorism too broad.289  The minimum elements of  a definition of  terrorism can be parsed out by 
starting from an overly broad definition of  political offence found in the 1985 Treaty.290  Amended 
Article 1 States that: 
“For the purposes of  the Extradition Treaty, none of  the following shall be regarded as an 
offence of  a political character: 
(a) an offence for which both Contracting Parties have the obligation pursuant to a 
multilateral international agreement to extradite the person sought or to submit his case to 
their competent authorities for decision as to prosecution; 
(b) murder, voluntary manslaughter, and assault causing grievous bodily harm; 
(c) kidnapping, abduction, or serious unlawful detention, including taking a hostage; 
(d) an offence involving the use of  a bomb, grenade, rocket, firearm, letter or parcel bomb, 
or any incendiary device if  this use endangers and person; and 
(e) an attempt to commit any of  the foregoing offences or participation as an accomplice of  
a person who commits or attempts to commit such an offence.”291
By excluding multiple types of  conduct, the 1985 Supplementary Treaty essentially leaves the 
283  See supra section IV (discussing the evolution of  the political offender exception and the conflict between the 
United States and the United Kingdom on the extradition of  IRA members). 
284  See beDi, supra note 28, at 180, 186-92 (describing the political offender exception as arising from individual revolt 
and the rise of  constitutionalism and democracy).
285  See id. at 186-92 (comparing the different uses of  the political offender exception).
286  See Liam G.B. Murphy, A Proposal on International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 2 touro J. trannat’l l. 67, 86 (1991) 
(“A definition of  terrorism must also answer whether or not the nature of  an act qualify as terrorism.”). 
287  Petersen, supra note 147, at 787. 
288  See 1985 Supplementary Treaty (preventing extradition for common crimes). 
289  See Sailer, supra note 197, at 336 (“[The Supplemental Treaty of  1985] substantially narrowed the application of  
the political offense exception between the two nations by effectively restricting it to nonviolent political action.”).
290  See generally 1985 Supplementary Treaty, supra note 198 (using the political offence as a starting point).
291  Id.
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definition of  political offence only to nonviolent political action.292  Nonviolent political offences 
have classically fallen under the rubric of  pure political offences.293  A political offence, and what is 
clearly not terrorism, involves two elements: (1) actions directed against the state or political organi-
zation without injuring private persons, property, or interests, and; (2) actions not accompanied by the 
commission of  common crimes.294  Therefore, violence, and at least the threat or support of  it, is a 
necessary element of  terrorism.295
What differentiates terrorism from normal violent crimes is that there is a political motive in the 
violence.296  It may seem odd that the term political is used to define terrorism, while the political 
offender exception seeks to define political as that which is permissible conduct.297  After all, ter-
rorism is a political action.298  However, the “political” in the political offender exception is seen as 
legitimate unconventional political conduct; whereas the political motivation in defining terrorism 
is considered crossing the line into illegitimate unconventional political conduct.299  Nations gener-
ally do not find the political nature of  relative political offences and terrorism actions objectionable 
in and of  themselves.300  Rather, it is the mixing of  the common crime and violent elements that 
requires an analysis of  the relative political offence to determine if  the political offender exception 
applies or it is an act of  terrorism.301  Thus, terrorism involves at least two elements: violence and 
political motivation.302
The debate over what is a relative political offence centers on the motivation component, by 
292  See Sailer, supra note 197, at 336 (the political offence exception between the two nations effectively restricts the 
exception to nonviolent political action).
293  See id. (noting that the United States and the United Kingdom narrowed the definition of  political offence to 
include only nonviolent activity).
294  wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 106; (emphasis added); see also beDi, supra note 28, at 181-82 (defining pure political 
offences as “offences directed against the political organization or government of  a state, containing no element 
of  a common crime whatsoever, and… to ‘relative political offences’. . . offences of  common character, but closely 
connected with political acts or events that are regarded as political.”).
295  See, e.g., blaCk’s law DiCtionary 1611 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added) (defining terrorism as “The use or threat 
of  violence to intimidate or cause panic, esp. as a means of  affecting political conduct.”). 
296  See saul, supra note 6, at 41-42 (differentiating the motive of  a normal offender from that of  a political offender).
297  See wiJnagert, supra note 23, at 106; (defining the characteristics of  a purely political crime); see also beDi, supra 
note 28, at 181-82 (describing the two general ways courts view pure political offences).
298  See Christopher C. Joyner, International Extradition and Global Terrorism: Bringing International Criminals to Justice, 25 
loy. l.a. int’l & CoMP. l. rev. 493, 496 (2003) (“An act of  terrorism is generally a political act.”). 
299  See Price, supra note 22, at 49 (describing the political offender exception as impartial to the actors ideological 
goals).
300  See id. at 50 (“[T]errorists who indiscriminately harmed innocents in pursuit of  a political objective would enjoy 
protection from extradition.”). 
301  See beDi, supra note 28, 180-82; see also Phillips, supra note 16, at 341 (stating that during the struggle to determine 
which offences merit protection, there was a division labeling some political offences as pure and others as relative).
302  See beDi, supra note 28, at 182 (“[A]n ordinary offence assumes the character of  a political offence when the aim 
of  the author of  the offence is to injure the political regime.”).
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looking at either the subjective intent of  the individual or objective tactics and methods.303  This can 
be seen in the difference between Swiss and French political offender tests and the American and 
English incidence test.304  Generally, the French political offence test is objective, but it contains a 
subjective element by looking towards if  the political target is sufficiently political for the potential 
political offender.305  The Swiss political motivation or predominance test, that looks to the motiva-
tion of  the political offender and seeks to balance the objective element with the proportionality of  
violence, has a substantial subjective component.306  In contrast, the American and English incidence 
test focuses on whether an action is part of  an uprising based partially on the choice of  target and 
the political climate in the region in which the offence is committed.307  
An exclusively objective approach is too narrow because it denies political attacks against non-
political institutions.308   However, the purely objective approach is also too formal in that no distinc-
tion is made between political crimes and those committed on political target for personal motives.309 
For these reasons, the objective test is rarely applied in its purest form and most political offence 
tests contain some subjective element.310  
A pure subjective approach is also problematic because a person can have only a slight political 
motive and commit disproportionate actions for that motive to be barred from extradition.311  Thus, 
most nations that focus on the subjective component of  a political offence also look to the propor-
tionality of  the political action.312  In defining political offences, states generally either start from an 
objective point of  view and infuse a subjective element, or start from a subjective point a view an 
infuse an objective element.313  
It could be said that the by focusing solely on whether a target is sufficiently political, the French 
courts are following the norms of  criminal law.314  This argument is based on the concern that by 
focusing on the subjective component that is not part of  criminal law, states may avoid harmoniz-
ing their criminal laws.315  However, even the French have infused a subjective component in their 
303  See Philips, supra note 15, at 343-48 (elaborating on the different relative political offence tests); see also 
wiJnargert, supra note 23, at 108-10 (“The category of  “related” political crimes is very wide and can in fact apply to 
each common crime which is politically motivated or which is related to a political conflict situation.”).
304  See id. at 120-23 (comparing objective, subjective, and mixed theories of  the political offender test). 
305  See id. at 122-23 (describing the subjective theory). 
306  See id. at 126-27 (explaining the proportionality theory). 
307  See id. at 111-19 (elaborating on the Great Britain political incidence theory). 
308  See id. at 122 (identifying the limits of  the pure political approach). 
309  See id. (noting that political character is denied to acts that do not “constitute a direct attack” on a “political 
institution”).
310  Id. at 120. 
311  See id. at 122 (arguing that the objective standard is “too radical and too formal in practice”). 
312  See Perry, supra note 11, at 718-22 (Swiss employ a proportionality test). 
313  See wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 126-29 (discussing the divergent frameworks that states can employ). 
314  See Perry, supra note 11, at 722-23 (noting that the French approach considers only the “nature of  the affected 
target”). 
315  See Joyner, supra note 298, at 498 (discussing the politically sensitive nature of  defining terrorism). 
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objective test.316  Also, motivation is largely what distinguishes political offences and acts of  terror-
ism from common crimes.317  Finally, motivation by definition lends itself  to a subjective analysis.318  
Since the definition of  what is politically motivated conduct combines subjective and objective 
elements in the political offender exception, 319 the political motivation element in defining terrorism 
should contain both subjective and objective elements.  
Perhaps the Swiss test is most illustrative because “the emphasis is laid upon the act itself  and 
both the intentions behind it and its consequences are evaluated function of  it.”320  The proportion-
ality test limits acceptable political offences to those that are necessary to carry out political objec-
tives, and some actions, like killing civilians, are never proportional.321  The Swiss test also amelio-
rates the concerns of  focusing on the subjective component of  political offences by placing conduct 
in categories, which partially removes the subjective component.322   
In defining terrorism by focusing on motivation, it is beneficial to place conduct into categories 
focusing on the proportionality of  the conduct to the action.323  The first category will be always 
acceptable political motivated action.324  The second will be occasionally acceptable political conduct, 
depending on the context and the proportionality of  the goals; for example, killing a soldier during 
an armed conflict.325  The final category will be conduct that is never condonable, such as intention-
ally killing civilians.326  Thus, certain actions are always proportional if  there is some political motiva-
tion, while others are never proportional despite their political motivation.327  
To determine whether specific conduct is not proportional to a political cause, and to further 
develop the subjective component of  political motivation, it is beneficial to look towards bilateral 
316  See Yakoob, supra note 53, at 554-55 (“Although the crimes charged were arson and murder, France found that the 
crimes, in light of  the circumstances, were relative political.”). 
317  See id. at 549 (motivation is a necessary component in defining political offences).
318  See id. (“The motivation driving the political offender distinguishes him or her from the common criminal . . . .”)
319  See wiJngaert, supra note 23 at 120-23 (comparing objective, subjective, and mixed theories of  the political 
offender test).
320  Id. at 132. 
321  See Perry, supra note 11, at 719-22 (analyzing conduct based on its proportionality to the political objective). 
322  See id. at 720 (citing In re Kaphengst, 59 BG 1 457, 5 ann. Dig. 292 (Switz. Fed. Trib. 1930)) (individual accused 
of  planting several bombs that injured civilians was a violence not proportionate to the desired goal because attacks on 
civilians are in a category that is never proportional to the goal of  any political cause). 
323  See id. at 721 (weighing the political motive against the criminal element).
324  See Petersen, supra note 147, at 788 (in defining terrorism, “uncertainty clashes with uncertainty when terrorism 
has to be located on a scale of  acceptable political struggle in the context of  deciding on protection from extradition.”). 
325  See Joyner, supra note 298, at 536 (“military forces engaged in armed conflict are governed by the laws of  war and 
international humanitarian law, as opposed to rules prohibiting terrorist activities.”). 
326  See Perry, supra note 11, at 721 (citing In re Kaphengst, 59 BG 1 457, 5 ann. Dig. 292 (Switz. Fed. Trib. 1930)) 
(individual accused of  planting several bombs that injured civilians was a violence not proportionate to the desired 
goal because attacks on civilians are in a category that is never proportional to the goal of  any political cause).  But see 
Creegan, supra note 3, at 250 (“politically motivated attacks on civilians, while still detested, have not crystallized as totally 
impressible acts.”).
327  See Perry, supra note 11, at 718-20 (analyzing the flexible “predominance” test used by the Swiss).
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treaties and multi-national conventions.328  Some treaties and conventions focus on specific physi-
cal acts and tactics, while others emphasize broader definitions of  politically motivated crimes.329  
Between 1963 and 2005, twelve treaties and five protocols were conducted to address terrorism, cre-
ated largely in response to specific terrorist incidents.330  For example, the 1997 Terrorist Bombing 
Convention was in response to the United States’ interest in Saudi Arabia, gas attacks in Tokyo, and 
bombings in Sri Lanka, Israel, and the United Kingdom.331  In defining terrorist actions, the focus 
ranges from emphasis on targets (international aircraft for instance), methods or means (such as 
hostage tacking), and the use of  particular weapons (for example, plastic explosives).332  It is impor-
tant in defining terrorism to specifically lay out which conduct, tactics, and weapons are not permis-
sible political actions.333
There are several political actions that are generally not acceptable under the political offence 
exception and are clearly acts of  terrorism.334  These are based on either long-established definitions, 
or specific conduct that is generally agreed upon to be an act of  terrorism based on a response to 
a specific incident or series of  incident.335  For example, the International Convention Against the 
Taking of  Hostages was motivated in part by the 1976 taking of  Israeli nationals by Palestinian ter-
rorists.336  The next step in defining terrorism will involve listing the generally agreed-upon acts of  
terrorism.337  
There are numerous conventions and treaties that list acts of  terrorism, and this has been one 
of  the primary methods to contrast terrorist and political offences.338  For example, the League 
of  Nations deemed assassination attempts sufficiently nonpolitical acts of  terrorism.339  Because 
there are a growing number of  conventions that list acts that are considered terrorism, or address a 
328  See saul, supra note 6, at 129-30.
329  See id. at 129-31 (stating that some treaties were reactions to “particularly egregious acts” while others were meant 
to fill “normative gaps”).
330  See id. at 130 n.10 (1963 Tokyo Convention; 1970 Hague Convention; 1971 Montreal Convention; 1973 Protected 
Persons Convention; 1979 Hostages Convention; 1980 Vienna Convention; 1988 Montreal Protocol; 1988 Rome 
Convention; 1988 Rome Protocol; 1991 Plastic Explosives Convention; 1994 UN Personnel Convention; 1997 Terrorist 
Bombing Convention; 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention; 2005 Nuclear Terrorism Convention). 
331  Id. at 131 (citing S. Witten, The International Convention for the Suppression of  Terrorist Bombings, 92 aM. J. int’l l.774 
(1998)). 
332  Id. at 131-32. 
333  See id. at 131-32 (noting that the treaties prohibited that act, not the motivation).
334  See, e.g., Convention for the Prevention of  Terrorism, art 2 (attacks on heads of  state). 
335  See, e.g., International Convention Against the Taking of  Hostages, 17 December 1979, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., 
6th Comm., Agenda Item 113, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/34/L.23(1979), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1456, 1457.  Entered into force 
June 3, 1983; for the U.S. Jan. 6, 1985. TIAS 11081 (Hostage Taking). 
336  See JosePh laMbert, terrorisM anD hostages in international law: a CoMMentary on the hostages 
Convention 1979 57-58, 65-67 (1990) (highlighting the “dramatic and well-publicized incidents of  hostage taking”). 
337  See Louis Rene Beres, The Meaning of  Terrorism: Jurisdictional and Definitional Clarifications, 28 vanD. J. transnat’l l. 
239, 249 (1995) (a definition of  terrorism necessarily includes both permissible and impermissible forms of  insurgency). 
338  See saul, supra note 6, at 45 (one approach is to define terrorism not only by its political motivation, but a range 
of  more objective public-orientated motives). 
339  See Convention for the Prevention of  Terrorism, Art 2. 
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specific concern of  terrorism in the international community, one way to define terrorism is to cite 
to these other conventions and treaties.340  The European Convention on the Suppression of  Terror-
ism makes references to other conventions and enumerates additional examples of  terrorism.341  The 
Convention specifically deems that the following are to be regarded as acts of  terrorism and are not 
political offences:
a. an offence within the scope of  the Convention of  Unlawful Seizure of  Aircraft, signed 
at The Hague on 16 December 1970;
b. an offence within the scope of  the Convention for the Suppression of  Unlawful Acts 
against Civil aviation, signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971;
c. a serious offence involving an attack against life, physical integrity or liberty of  interna-
tionally protected persons, including diplomatic agents;
d. an offence involving kidnapping, the taking of  hostages or serious unlawful detention; 
e. an offence involving the use of  a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic firearm or letter or 
parcel bomb if  this endangers persons; 
f. an attempt to commit any of  the foregoing offences or participation as an accomplice of  
a person who commits or attempts to commit such an offence.342
Additional international conventions have expanded what can be considered support to terror-
ists, beyond serving as an accomplice to a person who commits terrorism.343  For instance, the In-
ternational Convention for the Suppression of  Financing Terrorism prohibits funding anyone who 
intends to commit an act of  terrorism.344  Also, additional tactics and weapons have been included as 
acts of  terrorism to address the growing types of  threats, such as nuclear terrorism.345  The Euro-
pean Convention on the Suppression of  Terrorism, with some modifications and additions, is a way 
to further elaborate on the definition of  terrorism beyond violent and political motivated conduct.346 
Before laying out the definition of  terrorism, it is necessary to point out the complications that 
arise from enumerating certain tactics and targets, as well as those stemming from the European 
Convention for the Suppression of  Terrorism.  One problem with labeling attacks on specific targets 
340  See saul, supra note 6, at 212 (resolutions have been applied specific manifestations of  terrorism including 
financing terror groups, involvement in organized crime, hostage taking and using explosives). 
341  See European Convention on the Suppression of  Terrorism, art. 1. Jan. 27, 1977, 27 I. 1997, ETS no. 090. 
[hereinafter European Convention on the Suppression of  Terrorism] (referencing the Convention for the Suppression 
of  Unlawful Seizure of  Aircraft and the Suppression of  Unlawful Acts against Safety of  Civil Aviation, as well as attacks 
on life, physical integrity, or liberty; kidnapping; and offences involving the use of  explosives).
342  Id.   
343  International Convention for the Suppression of  the Financing of  Terrorism, G.A.Res. 54/109, adopted 9 
December 1999, opened for signature 10 January 2000, reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 270 (2000) (resolution adopted measures against 
those who finance terror activities, not just those that commit them).
344  Id., art. 2(1).
345  See International Convention for the Suppression of  Acts of  Nuclear Terrorism (adopted by UNGA Resolution 
59/290 of  15 Apr 2005) (open for signature 14 Sep 2005-31 Dec 2006). 
346  See Perry, supra note 2, at 251 (the vast majority of  definitions of  terrorism contain some reference to the two 
most common components of  violence and a political purpose or motivation). 
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is that there is not a clear list of  banned conduct.347  For example, some may even find it justifiable 
to kill civilians in certain circumstances.348  The reason for the uneasiness in banning certain tactics, 
even the killing of  civilians, is that countries with a colonial history owe their independence to using 
such methods when faced against a superior military power.349  Another complication with focusing 
on tactics and targets is that a group could feign political motives to mask financial ones in the hopes 
of  gaining legitimacy.350  Finally, the European Convention for Suppression on Terrorism is at points 
too broad, specifically when it lists the use of  automatic firearms as a terrorist action.351  While this 
may make sense for Europe, which has a general ban on automatic firearms, it does not make sense 
in nations that permit the use of  such weapons.352  Thus, there are complications with listing terror-
ist acts in general and with the European Convention itself  beyond having to be updated to address 
new tactics and concerns. 
There are several ways to address some of  these complications.  One way is to make a specific 
exception for acts of  rebellion against racist or colonial regimes, considering these are more in the 
category of  traditional political offences.353  Moreover, even revolutionaries could be limited to ac-
tions that do not conform to justifiable international standards for violent conduct.354  There can 
also be a general ban on the killing of  civilians, with the exception that certain non-innocent civil-
ians that are part of  oppressive regimes or those that support genocide can lose their “innocent” 
status.355  Also, by placing certain conduct in categories, determinations of  motivation and justifica-
tion can be made based on circumstances.356  Finally, while helpful, the European Convention for 
Suppression of  Terrorism is simply a starting point to work from to develop not the end of  point of  
this discussion.  The following proposal for a definition of  terrorism incorporates the understanding 
347  See Creegan, supra note 3, at 250-51.
348  See id. at 250 (“Politically motivated attacks on civilians, while still detested, have not crystallized as totally 
impressible acts.”). 
349  See id. (“Countries with colonial histories often owe their independence to national liberation groups who were 
willing to use such tactics to fight the superior military power of  their oppressors.”). 
350  See saul, supra note 6, at 42 (identifying the evidentiary issues in separating true political motives from private 
ones). 
351  See European Convention on the Suppression of  Terrorism (stating that any use of  a bomb, rocket, grenade, 
parcel bomb or automatic firearm to endanger a person will not constitute a political act).
352  See generally Allen Rostron, High Powered Controversy: Gun Control, Terrorism, and the Fight Over .50 Caliber Rifles, 73 u. 
Cin. l. rev. 1415 (2005) (there is a long standing debate over the banning of  .50 Caliber rifles in the U.S. considering 
their prevalent use in sport).
353  See kittrie, supra note 271, at 340 (typology outlines of  political offenders can “be concretely and objectively 
applied to virtually all categories of  actors taking part in political conflicts.”). 
354  See saul, supra note 6, at 81-87 (stating that “classic revolutions often involved ‘terrorist’ methods,” but that there 
is no recognized right to rebel in international law, and thus rebellion creates a start of  armed conflict in which the rebels 
are combatants). 
355  See id. at 90-91 (noting that the argument of  “non-innocence” is most persuasive for  “voluntary” actors, such as 
police and government officials, or even Israeli settlers (in the conflict with Palestine). 
356  See Perry, supra note 11, at 721 (citing In re Kaphengst, 59 BG 1 457, 5 Ann. Dig. 292 (Switz. Fed. Trib.) (1930)) 
(individual accused of  planting several bombs that injured civilians was a violence not proportionate to the desired goal 
because attacks on civilians are in a category that is never proportional to the goal of  any political cause).
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that defining terrorism is a solution to the some of  the problems with the political offender excep-
tion, is based on the development of  mostly treaties in international law, and addresses some of  the 
possible problems with enumerating a definition of  terrorism: 
Terrorism is not to be regarded as a political offence or an offence connected with a political 
offence or inspired by political motives, it is a violent action or support of  a violent action 
with motives besides personal or financial gain:
The following are NEVER to be regarded as acts of  terrorism:
a. nonviolent political protest or speech;
b. what is otherwise not considered a general crime in the nation is which the offence oc-
curs if  not for its political character.
The following MAY be considered acts of  terrorism if  committed outside an armed conflict 
unless a court or tribunal finds that the actions are proportional to a specific political motive, 
or as part of  a rebellion opposing an oppressive or racist regime: 
a. a serious offence involving an attack against life, physical integrity or liberty of  interna-
tionally protected persons, including diplomatic agents;
b. an offence involving kidnapping, the taking of  hostages, or serious unlawful detention; 
c. an offence involving the use of  a bomb, grenade, rocket, or letter or parcel bomb if  this 
endangers persons; 
d. an attempt to commit any of  the foregoing offences or participation as an accomplice of  
a person who commits or attempts to commit such an offence;
e. the financing of  an individual or group participating in the above action as detailed in the 
International Convention for the Suppression of  the Financing of  Terrorism, adopted 9 
December 1999.
The following are ALWAYS to be considered an act of  terrorism if  committed outside of  an 
armed conflict:
a. an offence within the scope of  the Convention of  Unlawful Seizure of  Aircraft, signed 
at The Hague on 16 December 1970;
b. an offence within the scope of  the Convention for the Suppression of  Unlawful Acts 
Against Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971;
c. an offence within the scope of  the International Convention for the Suppression of  
Acts of  Nuclear Terrorism, adopted 15 April 2005;  
d. the intentional killing of  an innocent civilian(s) who is clearly a noncombatant(s); 
e. an attempt to commit any of  the foregoing offences or participation as an accomplice of  
a person who commits or attempts to commit such an offence;
f. the financing of  an individual or group participating in the above action as detailed in the 
International Convention for the Suppression of  the Financing of  Terrorism, adopted 9 
December 1999. 
The definition listed above is by no means perfect, partially because it relies on a much more 
103NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEFVol. 2, No. 2
subjective approach then an objective one.357  It also does not address new concerns of  terrorism 
not codified in international treaties, such as cyber terrorism.358  Finally, it does not incorporate 
all the international treaties and agreements on terrorism, just some of  the more widely accepted 
ones.359  However, “[n]o definition can possibly cover all the varieties of  terrorism that have ap-
peared through history.”360  The purpose of  this definition is not to address every potential deficien-
cy, but to create a working definition based on some established norms and adherence to the goals 
of  creating the political offender exception.  The method of  defining terrorism by focusing on the 
political offender exception, as outlined above, is more beneficial to others than the exact definition 
itself.  Thus, the process of  defining terrorism should involve an examination of  the political of-
fender exception to determine who is a revolutionary and who is a terrorist. 
ix. ConClusion  
Defining terrorism has become nearly impossible for the international community and even 
within individual nations, like the United States.361  The process is fraught with political overtones 
and belies concerns about ceding sovereignty to an international body in this area of  law.362  How-
ever, there needs to be an international consensus on terrorism.  The lack of  clear definition of  
terrorism or the political offender exception, as was the situation in the IRA cases with England and 
the United States, strains international relations.363  Also, without a universal definition of  terror-
ism the field of  asylum law becomes even more vague.364  The failure to define terrorism prevents 
the international community from distinguishing between actual terrorism and legitimate forms of  
violent resistance to political oppression.365  In addition, a loose definition of  terrorism allows for 
any potential political opposition to be painted as terrorists, even if  those individuals are pursuing 
357  There are arguably greater problems in using a more objective approach.  See, e.g., saul, supra note 6, at 65-66 
(showing how the objective approach can be simultaneously under and over inclusive). 
358  See generally Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Cyberterrorism: The Next Great Threat to Aviation, 24 no. 1 air & sPaCe law 4 
(2011) (“cyberterrorism” is a rapidly expanding threat, especially to aviation, that has not yet been adequately addressed 
by the international community). 
359  See, e.g., saul, supra note 6, at 134 (status of  international treaties). 
360  walter laQueur, the age oF terrorisM 11 (1987).
361  The United Nations has not passed anything beyond condemnation measures.  See generally G.A. Res. 3034 
(XXVII), U.N. Doc. A/8967(Dec. 18, 1972; G.A. Res. 40/61, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., (Dec. 09, 1985).  There is a 
definition of  “terrorism” in the U.S. Code, but this is arguably only used for purposes of  designating certain groups as 
terrorism for purposes of  limit financing and immigration issues only.  18 U.S.C. §2331(1) (2006) (terrorism applies to 
any criminal action targeted or with the purpose of  intimidating a civilian population or government).   
362  See Joyner, supra note 298, at 498 (the politically sensitive aspect of  defining terrorism has made many nations 
reluctant in harmonizing their criminal codes around a common definition of  terrorism).
363  See Branick, supra at 159, at 169-70 (discussing the conflict between the United States and the United Kingdom 
over the refusal of  U.S. courts to extradite members of  the IRA). 
364  See PriCe, supra note 22, at 93-94 (humanitarian approach to asylum has encouraged the perception that asylum 
offers nothing to the receiving states other than moral satisfaction).
365  See saul, supra note 6, at 317 (arguing that such legitimate violence should not be internationally criminalized). 
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legitimate means of  opposition or fall outside the basic understanding of  terrorism.366  Finally, there 
cannot be prosecution for a crime without a definition of  the offence.367  Terrorism must be defined 
at the international level. 
In order to define terrorism, it is beneficial to look first to the roots of  defining it in the interna-
tional community: the political offender exception, which is an exception to extradition.368  By look-
ing at the development of  the political offender exception through the definition of  relative politi-
cal offences, the definition of  terrorism can be more clearly established.369  For example, the Swiss 
proportionality test lays out an objective test without shying away from the occasional subjective 
components.370  The definition of  terrorism, and by contrast the definition of  political offences, can 
further be refined by looking towards international treaties and agreements on terrorism.  The Euro-
pean Convention on the Suppression of  Terrorism is particularly helpful for developing a definition 
of  terrorism since it incorporates other generally agreed upon definitions and treaties and enumer-
ates certain conduct generally agreed upon to be terrorist activity.371  The complications of  providing 
a specific enumerated list of  terrorist actions, such as not adequately allowing for acts of  rebellion 
against racist regimes, can be prevented by incorporating the proportionality test in the definition of  
terrorism. 
The definition of  terrorism in section VIII is not perfect.  It may prove better to use a differ-
ent political offender test, such as the American and English incidence test.  It may also be better to 
exclude certain international definitions, such as the Convention for the Suppression of  Terrorism 
Financing, and incorporate others, such as the 1998 Draft Rome Statute.  However, the international 
community needs to move towards consensus on terrorism.  “[T]he search for a single definition has 
come to resemble the quest for the Holy Grail.”372  The quest to find a definition for terrorism can 
reach a conclusion by understanding and incorporating the political offender exception.  After com-
ing to a consensus for a definition of  terrorism through the political offender exception, debates on 
who is a revolutionary and who is a terrorist will be more easily settled. 
366  See Warbrick, supra note 273, at 1002-03 (noting that the “political opponent, the industrial activist, [or] the 
unpopular migrant” could be labled as a terrorist). 
367  See Perry, supra note 2, at 270 (conflicting definitions create a problem of  notice because individuals are uncertain 
if  the definition of  terrorism applies to them).
368  See beDi, supra note 28, at 180-81 (noting that the political offence exception started as a general stipulation about 
the extradition of  political offenders in bilateral treaties); see also Perry, supra note 11, at 716 (examining the “emerging 
doctrine” of  the political offence exception). 
369  See saul, supra note 6, at 42-43 (concluding that, while not definition can be exhaustive, the political offence 
exception usually excludes atrocious acts or violence that is far removed from the political goal). 
370  See wiJngaert, supra note 23, at 126-29, 132 (noting how the Swiss definition developed over time to include 
features from a variety of  theories).
371  See, e.g., European Convention for the Suppression of  Terrorism, art. 1 (incorporating the Convention for the 
Suppression of  Unlawful Seizure of  Aircraft and the Convention for the Suppression of  Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of  Civil Aviation). 
372  oMar Malik, enough oF the DeFinition oF terrorisM xvii (2000). 
